Dutch arms exports and SIPRI ranking

a) most Dutch surplus weapons sold fall under the eleven categories researched (see SIPRI sources and methods) and SIPRI gives them a 40% value of the original cost in its Trend Indicator Value (TIV). The Netherlands has, unlike other countries, a transparent policy on the sale of surplus arms and this combined leads to a high export value; and

b) because small arms and ammunition are not included, the substantial small arms and ammunition industries of other EU countries are not included in the ranking.

“All together the methodology results in the description of the Netherlands as a relatively big arms exporter,” and, “the picture would be different when all exports of military material were included and when the value of export permission or actual exports were taken to measure the value,”the Minister concludes.

The surplus argument is peculiar, because SIPRI reports also on the exports of surplus arms from other countries. Maybe their governments don't report as clearly as the Dutch government does, but surplus exports of major arms are – as industrial exports - in the Transfers of major weapons database for all countries based on a wide range of sources, not only on government reporting.

Small arms do not make much difference in the reporting as their financial volume is limited. Germany for example provided licenses for small arms exports in 2006-2016 valued € 561 million. This is just over one percent of all German military exports accounting for € 55 billion. All EU members together issued export licenses for small arms valued € 3 billion in 2016 of which 80% (€ 2.4 billion) for export to the US. Compared to the total of € 190 billion military exports this is less than 2%. EU ammunition export permissions valued were € 8 billion in 2016. Thus including both ammo and small arms has some effect: Belgium and Austria would join the league of large arms exporters. So the minister has a point here.

Not mentioned however is that the Rotterdam harbor facilitates the shipping of large amounts of small arms and ammunition to destinations such as as the Philippines, South Africa. China exports ammunition through Rotterdam to Italy. The Netherlands is an international hub for arms exports (see: The Netherlands transit of small arms and ammunition 2013-2018) which is not counted by SIPRI but gives our country a big role in the international arms trade.

Arms export is not a sports event where ranking makes sense, but a serious issue for peace, stability, human rights and development. When Sweden will start exporting its Gripen fighter jets to Brazil, it will directly surpass the Netherlands in the near future. Which shows the relative value of such a ranking order. Relevant is that over a quarter of global major arms sales come from European Union member states. Combined with North America, western countries are responsible for 60% of all international trade in major weapon systems.

The main clients of Dutch arms exports buy in the categories surplus and naval.(see table 2).

Jordan is 1^st mainly because of the sale of F-16 aircraft. Jordan is a country using its fighter aircraft in Syria and in the Saudi led coalition against Yemen. Dutch weapons count for 43% of Jordan's major arms imports in 2013-2017.

Indonesia is 2^nd because of the sale of Damen warships, which will have a huge impact in this volatile region. (SIPRI does not include Thales command and control systems, a major part of Dutch arms exports.)

The US is 3^rd also because of license build Damen Stan Patrol-4708 ships. The US is however far more important for the Netherlands as a receiver of components for missiles, helicopters and fighter aircraft (see table 3). Those components are not separately reported in international statistics, because they are assembled in bigger systems.