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War from space

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The official headquarters of Airbus can be found in the middle of Leiden, near the oldest university of the Netherlands. In big white washed production halls, robot arms for a space station are hanging in a frame. The well-known Ariane rocket, the European launch vehicle for the European Space Agency satellite launchings, is maintained in Leiden. But also the smaller VEGA rocket, which can bring satellites into space in a more cost-efficient way. Far reaching ideas can be expected in this environment. Leiden University is the Dutch institute which educated and employed the most Nobel Prize Laurates. Airbus Leiden is tapping into this pool of knowledge. 


Airbus Defence and Space Netherlands is not directly focussed on weaponry. For the Dutch government, the military and the industry, this facility is an entrance into the wide portfolio of Airbus Defence projects in Europe. Knowledge created in Airbus Leiden Space Production is shared with other facilities, included this on defence and weaponry. Technology developed in Leiden is used in military simulation and training, such as the Embedded Combat Aircraft Training System (ECATS) for the F-35. Airbus Leiden also cooperates with the Dutch Ministry of Defence for tailor made products.

Space (and interconnected cyber) is the quick developing new dimension of warfare and thus of military applications, soft- and hardware. It is also a priority for the European Union to develop this. The European Commission adopted a Space Strategy for Europe with the aim, among other things, to develop additional European space-based services such as developed by Airbus. Satellites bring devices into space for military communication and intelligence. Such as the advanced military multi-band communication satellite GSAT-7 launched for the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). It was 17th Indian satellite launched from ESA with the Airbus Ariane from the launch site in French Guyana.

The main military applications for satellites are navigation (including for guided weapons and drones), communication and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), all roughly taking one third of its milsatcom capacity. All market surveys expect enormous growth of the military satellite market (now roughly US$ 5 billion), from a forecast of 5 percent annual growth rate (CAGR) to a prediction of 70 percent in the next ten years.

“We are launching military satellites for many countries so we have all the security means in place for these satellites, which are very sensitive in terms of access to the spacecraft and the data,according to Jacques Breton, senior vice president of sales and business development at Arianespace, to IHS Jane's. One of its last launches, in December 2016, of an Airbus VEGA-rocket brought in space a GÖKTÜRK-1 satellite as part of a contract with the Under-secretariat for Defence Industries of Turkey (SSM). “Its images are intended for civilian and military applications. Even the US has considered rockets from Airbus Space for its military launches.

But it is not only the scale of warfare changing which includes new dimensions, it is also the relation between market and military which creates new rules of play. Satellites and ISR information give companies their own intelligence input, which can be sold and shared. Private companies as providers of intelligence are a relatively new phenomenon. An example is the cooperation with IHS (publisher of military magazines) which offers its readers satellite images of hot spots in Syria, the South China Sea or the region around Yemen. IHS provides this information for clients worldwide. Which brings a range of questions on how is this controlled and who is responsible for that control.

In February 2016, Airbus announced the launch of one of eight satellites forming the privately owned so-called Skynetwork. Part of this is the XEBRA milsatcom service meant for secure tactical and intelligence communication in harsh and remote environments by primarily the military and governments.

Airbus Defence and Space provides all Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS, over 600 miles) communications to the UK Ministry of Defence and also allows other NATO and allied governments to use Skynet's services: “ensuring reliable and tactical communications, even on the edge of cover, making it ideal for naval and airborne platforms.” This leasing of communication and intelligence capacity is blurring the lines between government and private entities on core military activities. It is incredible that communication, navigation and intelligence gathering are privatised. War and conflict are no economic activities to gain profit from. They must be controlled by governments decisions and kept far from commercial interests.



Werkgelegenheid en militaire productie

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'Militaireproductie en Neerlands welvaren,' dat is de kop boven een artikel in de Militaire Spectator van december 2016, geschreven. De Militaire Specator is sinds 1832 de wetenschappelijke uitgave voor en over de Nederlandse krijgsmacht. Een blad voor houwdegens zou je denken. Oók. Maar ook een blad voor wetenschap en verdieping. De conclusie van het artikel door Dr. KTZA bd Bakker en prof. dr. Beeres van de Nederlandse Defensie Academie verraste me.

Deze Broekstukken is niet veel meer dan een signalering. Het hele artikel is aan te raden.

In het artikel wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen studies naar de waarde van militaire productie voor de Nederlandse economie in het licht van die hele economie (voorbeeld CPB sudies) en studies vanuit uitsluitend de defensie-industrie, zoals private onderzoeksinstellingen dat doen. “Die [private instellingen] zijn vooral geïnteresseerd in de positieve effecten van militaire productie en de mogelijkheden om die productie binnen Nederland tot stand te brengen.” Als het gaat om werkgelegenheidseffecten dan zijn die vrijwel nihil.

De auteurs noemen achtereenvolgens drie rapporten over de werkgelegenheidsgevolgen van de F-35: 2009 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) dat 50.000 manjaren werk voorziet; SEO Economisch Onderzoek stelde in 2012 dat er een krapte is op de markt voor technici, een krapte die voorlopig aan zou houden en er dus geen sprake van nieuwe werkgelegenheid, maar van verschuiving zou zijn; en in 2015 wederom PwC dat zijn mening heeft bijgesteld en voor onderhoud een vrijwel volledige verschuiving ziet van technici en geen extra werkgelegenheid.“De Minister meldt dit niet,” stellen de schrijvers en de krapte op de arbeidsmarkt zou volgens hen (bijna) een extra reden zijn om de relatie tussen militaire productie en werkgelegenheid niet te noemen.

Ook het toverwoord innovatie wordt door hen onder de loep genomen. Innovaties die zorgen voor extra werk en omzet die het gevolg zijn van product- en marktinnovaties zijn gunstig voor de betrokken bedrijven, m.a.w. innovaties die geen beslag leggen op menselijke capaciteit. “Ze hebben voor de Nederlandse economie als geheel geen netto effect.” maar als die kennis kan worden geëxporteerd en niet in Nederland worden toegepast dan is er wel sprake van extra werkgelegenheid. Dat geldt ook voor innovatie van de productieprocessen en organisatie.

Opvallend is dat in de onderzoeken naar de economische effecten van militaire productie dit verschil tussen verschillende vormen van innovatie niet is gemaakt. De auteurs verwachten echter dat het merendeel van de innovaties voor de betrokkenen goed zijn, maar voor de economie van Nederland niet relevant. Ook is de kwaliteit van veel onderzoeken twijfelachtig aangezien ze zich op de toekomst richten en dus op verwachtingen. Die verwachtingen zijn grotendeels gebaseerd op enquêtes en interviews met managers van bedrijven en kenniscentra. SEO vraagt zich af of er geen sprake is van wishful thinking in plaats van redelijke verwachtingen.

De positieve effecten moet gezocht worden in de waarde van de producten die de krijgsmacht kan verweren en die krijgsmacht beschermt de Nederlandse economie. Toch vermoed ik dat het argument van werkgelegenheid zonder gêne gebruikt zal blijven worden.

Grootste Nederlandse wapenleveranties in oktober en november 2016

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Vandaag kwam de Nederlandse overheid met nieuwe gegevens rond de wapenhandel. In de tabel zijn de tien grootste wapenleveranties opgenomen. Opvallend is dat het in vier en daarmee het merendeel om leveranties aan de Golfstaten VAE en Qatar gaat. Met zo'n 145 miljoen euro gaat bijna om de helft van het totaal in deze twee maanden naar het Midden-Oosten. Verder liggen de afnemers verspreid door de NAVO en EU (3x), Latijns-Amerika (2x) en in Oost-Azië, Zuid-Korea. De maanden oktober en november leverde wapenleveranties ter waarde van ruim 300 miljoen euro op.

Bron
Damen is de belangrijkste exporteur van militaire producten in oktober en november 2016 (de laatste twee maanden waarvoor informatie beschikbaar is). Het gaat om de levering van patrouille schepen aan de VAE van de Arialah-klassedeze 70 meter lange schepen zijn bewapend met een OTO Melara 76/62 scheepskanon, 2 stuks OTO Melara MARLIN 30mm geschut en een Raytheon Mk 49 Mod 2 11-cell raketafvuurinstallatie. Het schip is uitgerust met een keur aan gevechts- en vuurleidingssystemen van Thales Nederland.
De twee schepen die worden geleverd aan Jamaica zijn een stuk kleiner en vervangen drie in 2005 en 2006 geleverde onbewapende patrouille schepen (die worden vervoerd naar Nederland en daar te koop aangeboden).

Radar en C3-systemen zijn doorgaans producten van die andere grote handelaar in militaire producten, Thales Nederland. Het gaat om de al genoemde levering aan de VAE waarvan de wapens worden aangestuurd en hun informatie krijgen van Thales systemen, maar ook vaste Thales klanten Noorwegen metSquire, Zuid-Koreaen Venezuela (met een groot aantal schepen uitgerust met Thales apparatuur, zoals 4 Guaiquerí-klasse patrouille schepen en 4 Guaicamacuto-klasse patrouille schepen, zie ook) zijn weer van de partij, en daarbij NAVO bondgenoot Noorwegen.

De derde leverancier is de overheid. Het gaat in dit geval om de levering van Leopard tanks aan Finland. De overheid is door de aard van de leveringen een opvallende wapenleverancier; ze neemt een groot deel van de niet maritieme leveranties van grote wapensystemen voor haar rekening.

Bron

Er zijn drie afnemers van het Fennek pantservoertuig. Dat zijn Duitsland, Nederland en Qatar. In Nederland produceert een volle dochter van het Duitse Krauss-Mafei, DDVS (Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems), de voertuigen. De levering aan Qatar kan volgens het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken geen kwaad. De Fennek is niet bewapend en ongeschikt voor inzet in de woestijn. Dat is opmerkelijk voor een voertuig genoemd naar een woestijn vos en geleverd aan een zandbak aan zee. Dewebsite van het Ministerie van Defensie noemt ze “stil, onopvallend, scherp observerend en zo nodig snel en fel.” Een belangrijke functie is het opsporen en doorgeven van de locatie doelen, zodat die eventueel kunnen worden bestookt met projectielen. In Duitsland was de leveringniet onomstreden. Gezien de bijdrage van Qatar aan de gevechten van islamisten in Syrië en bijdrage aan de oorlog tegen Jemen kunnen vraagtekens bij de levering worden geplaatst.

Onduidelijk is de categorie leveringen die wordt samengevat onder het kopje 'Delen voor vliegtuigen en helikopters,' voor EU, NAVO en bondgenoten (want daar staat die + voor: Australië, Japan, Nieuw Zeeland en Zwitserland). Door deze onduidelijke omschrijving valt weinig te zeggen over de leveringen. Valt Turkije eronder - een land dat zijn luchtmacht regelmatig inzet – of niet? Buitenlandse Zaken maakt in Nederland een uitzondering voor Turkije, maar doen de ontvangers van deze goederen dat ook? Gaat het om transport- of gevechtsvliegtuigen, patrouille- of aanvalshelikopters? De Nederlandse overheid verstrekt bovengemideld veel informatie, maar dat neemt niet alle vragen en twijfels weg.

Martin Broek





afgifte datum
goederen omschrijving
land (eind) van bestemming
Nederlandse producenten*
Bedrag
7-10-2016
Patrouillevaartuigen
VAE
Damen/Thales
70.000.000
6-10-2016
Leopard II tanks
Finland
Overheid
37.000.000
7-10-2016
Delen voor radar- en C3-systemen
Qatar
Thales
31.536.465
6-10-2016
Delen voor vliegtuigen en helikopters
EU/NAVO+
Onduidelijk
30.000.000
27-10-2016
Delen voor Fennek verkenningsvoertuigen
Duitsland (Qatar)
DDVS (Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems) 100% dochter van Krauss-Mafei
24.000.000
16-11-2016
Patrouillevaartuigen
Jamaica
Damen
23.429.179
24-10-2016
Radar- en C3-systemen
VAE
Thales
20.488.660
30-11-2016
Delen voor radar- en C3-systemen
Zuid-Korea
Thales
15.000.000
23-11-2016
Delen voor radar- en C3-systemen
Venezuela
Thales
11.775.200
26-10-2016
Draagbare rondzoekradars
Noorwegen
Thales
8.960.000

Totaal grootste tien oktober/november 2016
272.189.504

Totaal oktober/november 2016
309.901.495
Bron: tabel Maandelijkse rapportage uitvoer militaire goederen (van 30 januari 2017), zie https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2016/10/01/overzicht-uitvoer-militaire-goederen
* Kolom producenten, toegevoegd auteur


Week 6 in 25 tweets

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Dit is de eerste keer dat ik zo'n Facebook overzicht van mijn tweets maak. Daarom een paar opmerkingen. 

Dagelijks kom ik veel wapenhandel berichten tegen. Ik maak daaruit een selectie. 

Relatie met Nederland, EU, NAVO is van belang. 

Tweets zijn grotendeels berichten uit het Engelse en Nederlandse taalgebied. Dat betekent niet alleen dat het VK en de VS oververtegenwoordigd zijn, ook landen als India, Nigeria en Zuid-Afrika komen meer voor dan anderen.

Ook China, Indonesië en Japan houd ik bij vanwege mijn interesse in de ontwikkelingen aldaar.

Berichten over drones, kleine wapens (als het om meer dan een handje vol gaat en/of minder gangbaar),  (Nederlandse ) defensie-industrie en nog wat activisme en onderzoek. Hieronder een selectie van 25 tweets.
Nederlands fregat voor Indonesië, zie 8
De week stond vooral in het teken van het proces in het VK tegen leveringen aan Saoedi-Arabië. De VS deed ook nog een duit in het zakje. Er kwamen verschillende opmerkelijke zaken boven drijven.

Saudi-Arabië(dagelijks berichten vrijwel alle kranten erover).

2 - 090217: @MiddleEastEye report: UK government denies it ignored advice over Saudi arms sales http://ow.ly/ciTj308PI87

3 - 090217: Arming those behind most violent islamism: #Trump'to approve arms sales to #SaudiArabia' blocked by #Obama. https://t.co/ctcwlVvBdl

4 - 080217: Civil servants may understand what policiticians miss because they want to serve power politics & industry. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/07/official-advised-uk-minister-to-suspend-saudi-weapons-exports-court-hears?CMP=share_btn_tw#saudi

Nederland (zie ook onder defensie-industrie)

5 - 090217: Oped in Dutch Christian Daily Nederlands Dagblad: Close arms industry, creates US$ 1,700 bn a year - #ndnlhttps://t.co/6fovHfYWwc
Schaf de wapenindustrie af. Dat scheelt 1,700.000.000.000 dollar per jaar

6 - 080217: Reopening of court case Kouwenhoven, arms trader in Liberia, trial in the Netherlands https://t.co/VOZr2dF0Fb100217:OM eist 20 jaar zaak Guus #Kouwenhoven #wapenhandel #Liberia http://nos.nl/l/2157538  Public prosecutor demands 20 yrs. Continues in 2 wks. 110217 Dutch prosecutors demand 20 years for alleged gun runner to #Liberia Guus #Kouwenhoven. https://t.co/igK9vEb3Xp

7 - 070217: Major Dutch arms export: #Damen DSNS delivers first SIGMA 10514 PKR to Indonesian MoD https://t.co/1V6XIMkV6o

8 – 100217: Who is combining with the Dutch Ministry of Defence to make the world a more secure place? Cordaid and War Child?https://t.co/wvUqWW7hbg

Europese instituties

9 - 090217: European Parliament votes for EU army and want €100 billion !!! extra for defence by the end of next decade http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170209IPR61715/defence-meps-urge-member-states-to-show-political-will-and-join-forces

Duitsland

10 – 110217: Sputnik: German arms exported abroad ending up in the hands of child soldiers: https://t.co/hjHkrf4a0z To the report http://www.kindersoldaten.info/Aktuelles/Keine+Kleinwaffen+in+Kinderh%C3%A4nde%21.html

Tsjechië

11 - 080217: Abu Dhabi #NIMRpartners with #CzechVOP CZ. NIMR sold #vehiclesto Algeria, UAE and two other regional parties. http://www.janes.com/article/67237/nimr-to-partner-with-the-czech-republic-s-vop-cz#.WJsBXTzmdOE.twitter

12 - 070217: #CzechRepublic orders additional #PandurII vehicles from #TatraDefense Vehicles, India http://upi.com/6490237t via @upi

Gulf Cooperation Council GCC

13 - 100217 It continues. GCC defence spending ‘to rise due to security situation’

14 - 080217: #GCCbackground Briefing: Gulf Challeges by Charles Forrester: Gulf nations will spent more than US$ 70 bn. between '16-'20. JDW 010217 30-35.

Midden-Oosten

15 - Iraqi Kurds to receive sniper rifles, anti-tank weapons, mortars from Canada
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/iraqi-kurds-to-receive-sniper-rifles-anti-tank-weapons-mortars-from-canadavia @nationalpost

Japan

16 - 100217: Needed Japanese #armssales when a mini-Cold War emerges in East Asia and #Japan-US alliance appearing less robust. https://t.co/xeivrY9uzS

Kenia

17 – 110217:
US Bombs, ammunition, planes, FN HMP400 LLC Herstal 50 cal guns and more #aerospace for #Kenya, vallue: $418 million https://t.co/w0ZYezjXoJ

Turkije


19 - 060217: Questions by Dutch political party #SPon arms trade to #Turkey, context #UKdeliverance of military fighter aircraft https://drimble.nl/politiek/41419568/wapenhandel-met-turkije.html
Defensie-industrie
Damen (zie ook bij Nederland)
 
20 - 090217: Damen Shipyards Group hosts Industry Briefings in Australia i.v.m. competitie levering OPV's aan Australië https://t.co/uxsVPGp5aV

Overige defensie-industrie
21 - 100217: 'Rheinmetall Nederland kondigt forse ontslaggolf aan'https://t.co/n0fZQVhXXA

Wapens

Onderzeeërs

SM-3
23 - 070217: SM-3 missile in space, missile defence #TMD. Netherlands wants #SM3missile for its frigates. https://t.co/JRLTNTfmTf

Activisme en onderzoek
24 - 100217: How are lobbyists influencing the EU? LobbyFacts from @corporateeurope+ @lobbycontrolhelps to find out http://bit.ly/EUODPapps

25 - 100217: @StopWapenhandel (Stop Arms Trade), Amsterdam protests next week (15/02) against #lobby for higher defence budgets http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/node/1999

Nederlandse export van satellieten in 2016

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Er komen steeds meer kleine satellieten in de ruimte. Een tiende ervan heeft een duidelijk militaire functie. De Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Ruimtevaart(NVR) publiceerde in 2011 een tijdschrift gewijd aan kleine satellieten en de Nederlandse activiteiten op dit gebied. Nederland is is geen onbelangrijke partij op deze markt.



Die kleine satellieten kunnen voor veel doeleinden ingezet worden. Het KVR constateert:

“Wereldwijd kunnen krijgsmachten niet zonder satellieten voor zeer uiteenlopende doeleinden, zoals communicatie, navigatie, surveillance en intelligence. Commandovoering, geleiding van wapens, weersvoorspellingen en dergelijke zaken zijn afhankelijk van informatie die door satellieten wordt verkregen. Militaire satellieten vergroten de effectiviteit van bestaande defensiesystemen. Kleine satellieten worden steeds belangrijker vanwege vele voordelen, zoals de mogelijkheid van snelle ontwikkeling van nieuwe satellieten voor specifieke doeleinden.”

Satellieten zijn voor militaire inzet onmisbaar geworden.

De Nederlandse overheid is een van de meest transparante in Europa als het gaat om het geven van informatie over de export en doorvoer van strategische goederen. Strategische goederen zijn militaire goederen en goederen voor tweeërlei (civiel en militair) gebruik, ook wel dual use (DU) goederen genoemd.

Onlangs werd het nieuwe DU-overzicht gepubliceerd. In een tabel van zo'n 7.000 regels worden de exporten voor de periode 2004-2016 gegeven. Opvallend is het grote aantal satellietexporten in 2016. Tot 2016 zijn maar enkele vergunningen afgegeven voor (weer-)satellieten en voor onderdelen (waaronder optische technologie en ongedefinieerde onderdelen). De bestemmingen waren China, India en Zuid-Korea.

De flinke toename in 2016 komt vooral door de export van nanosatellieten. Deze zijn soms niet groter zijn dan een melkpak tot de omvang van een koelkast en worden met een raket in de ruimte gebracht. In Nederland heeft het Nationaal Lucht en Ruitevaartlaboratorium in Amsterdam de leiding bij een onderzoek naar de toepassing ervan, maar de TU Delft, TNO en kleinere ondernemingen zoals ISISen Cosine zijn eveneens betrokken bij die ontwikkeling.

De satellietmarkt is verdeeld in verschillende segmenten, zoals communicatie, observatie, waarneming, wetenschappelijk onderzoek, biologische experimenten, testen en demonstreren van technologie, wetenschap en navigatie. Op basis van eindgebruiker zijn de volgende partijen te onderscheiden: overheden, samenleving, bedrijfsleven, Defensie, energie, scheepvaart en transportsector.

Formal ISILaunch17 mission logo of February 2017
Het grootste deel van de Nederlandse satellietexporten in 2016 betreft nanosatellieten voor observatie. Zowel militairen als wetenschap en bedrijfsleven hebben hier baat bij. Observatie kan bedoelt zijn om oogsten te verbeteren, maar ook om tegenstanders in kaart te brengen, mogelijk zelfs als voorbereiding op een aanval of een gerichte uitschakeling van personen. Bij die militaire of repressieve toepassingen wringt hier de schoen.

De reputatie van de landen (China, Rusland, India, Israël, VAE) die de Nederlandse satellieten afnemen stelt niet gerust. Het is het bijvoorbeeld bekend dat Israël vanuit militaire overwegingen veel heeft geïnvesteerd in observatiesatellieten. De satellieten van het uiterst repressieve Singapore zijn o.a. bedoeld voor binnenlandse veiligheid en “voor militaire doeleinden; om te weten wat landen in de regio aan het doen zijn op land, in de lucht en op zee.” De Verenigde Arabische Emiraten (VAE) zijn betrokken in de vuile oorlog tegen het huidige regime in Jemen. Dat aardobservatie daarbij een rol kan spelen staat buiten kijf.

De markt voor kleine satellieten groeit in snel tempo en lang niet alle satellieten krijgen een militaire toepassing. Het merendeel krijgt een civiele bestemming, anderen een dubbelfunctie voor zowel civiele als militaire toepassingen. Helaas is het bij de Nederlandse exporten onduidelijk om wat voor toepassing het zal gaan, omdat de omschrijvingen 'Aardobservatie' en met name 'testen nieuwe technologieën' (China) en 'onderzoek in de ruimte' (VS) wel zeer vaag zijn. Op die manier is transparantie niet erg informatief. De typenaam van de satellieten zou voor een beoordeling van de levering genoemd moeten worden om vanuit de samenleving invloed te hebben op de export van goederen die steeds belangrijker worden, ook militair.

Nederlandse Dual Use satellietexporten in 2016
Datum aanvraag
Omschrijving
Ten bate van
Definitief
Tijdelijk
Bestemming
Bedrag
19 mei 2016
Nanosatelliet
Testen nieuwe technologieën
D
China
300.000
26 september 2016
Nanosatelliet
Aardobservatie
T
Rusland
2.129.925
17 november 2016
Nanosatelliet
Aardobservatie
T
Rusland
2.690.582
2 december 2016
Nanosatelliet
Onderzoek in de ruimte
D
VS
2.548.942
14 december 2016
Satelliet
Aardobservatie
D
Singapore
900.000
14 december 2016
Nanosatelliet
Aardobservatie
T
VS
47.160
22 december 2016
Nanosatelliet
Aardobservatie
D
VAE via India
100.000
22 december 2016
Nanosatelliet
Aardobservatie
D
Israël via India
2.200.000
23 december 2016
Nanosatellieten
Aardobservatie
D
India
7.832.861
Bron: Maandelijkse rapportage uitvoer dual use goederen 2004-2016, Rijksoverheid 31 januari 2017.


Dutch exports of dual-use satellites in 2016

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More and more small satellites are launched into space. A tenth of them has a clear military function. The Dutch Association for the Aerospace (NVR) in 2011 published a magazine dedicated to small satellites and the Dutch activities in this area. The Netherlands is not an insignificant party in this market.



Those small satellites can be used for many purposes. The KVR notes:

"Global forces can not do without satellites for a variety of purposes such as communication, navigation, surveillance and intelligence. Command, guidance of weapons, weather forecasts and similar issues are dependent on information obtained through satellites. Military satellites increase the effectiveness of existing defence systems. Small satellites are becoming increasingly important because of many advantages such as the possibility of rapid development of new satellites for specific purposes."

Satellites have become indispensable for military deployment.

The Dutch government is one of the most transparent in Europe when it comes to providing information on the export and transit of strategic goods. Strategic goods are military and dual-use (civil and military, DU) goods.

Recently, the new DU-list was published. In a table, of about 7,000 lines, exports for the period 2004-2016 are given. Striking is the large number of satellite exports in 2016. Until 2016 are just a few permits issued for (weather) satellites and components (including optical technology and undefined components). The destinations were China, India and South Korea.

Formal ISILaunch17 mission logo of February 2017
The significant increase in 2016 is mainly due to the export of nano satellites. These are sometimes not be greater than a milk carton to the size of a refrigerator and are brought into the room with a rocket. The Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) in Amsterdam is in charge of Dutch investigation into the application, but the Technical University Delft, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) and smaller – but not insignificant - companies such as ISISand Cosine are also involved in that development.

The market for satellites is divided into several segments, such as communications, surveillance, observation, scientific research, biological experiments, testing and demonstration of technology, science and navigation. Based on end-user, the following parties are distinguished: government, society, industry, defence, energy, marine and transportation industries.

The bulk of the Dutch satellite exports in 2016 relates to nano satellites for observation. Both military and science and industry benefit from this. Observation may be intended to improve the growing of crops, but also to identify opponents, possibly in preparation for an attack or a targeted elimination of people. The military or repressive applications are the controversial when discussing the export of strategic products.

The reputation of the countries (China, Russia, India, Israel, UAE) who purchase the Dutch satellites is not reassuring. It is known, for example from military considerations that Israel has invested heavily in observation satellites. The satellites of the extremely repressive Singapore among others intended for internal security and "for military purposes; to know what countries in the region are doing on land, air and sea." The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are involved in the dirty war against the current regime in Yemen. That earth observation could play a role in this war is indisputable.
The market for small satellites is growing rapidly and not all satellites have a military application. Most get a civil destination, others a dual function for both civilian and military applications.

Unfortunately, it is unclear for what purpose the Dutch exports are ment, because descriptions like 'Earth observation' and especially 'Testing new technologies' (China) and 'Rresearch in space' (US) are extremely vague. In this way, transparency is not very informative. The type name of the satellites should be mentioned to give society a possibility to assess on these growing exports, also for military purposes.

Dutch dual-use satellite exports in 2016
Submission date
Description
Application
Final
Temporarily
Destination
Amount
19/05/16
Nano Satellite
Testing new technologies
D
China
300,000
26/09/16
Nano Satellite
Earth observation
T
Russia
2,129,925
17/11/16
Nano Satellite
Earth observation
T
Russia
2,690,582
02/12/16
Nano Satellite
Research in Space
D
US
2,548,942
14/12/16
Satellite
Earth observation
D
Singapore
900,000
14/12/16
Nano Satellite
Earth observation
T
US
47,160
22/12/16
Nano Satellite
Earth observation
D
UAE via India
100,000
22/12/16
Nano Satellite
Earth observation
D
Israel via India
2,200,000
23/12/16
Nano Satellites
Earth observation
D
India
7,832,861
Source: Montly reports on exports of dual use products 2004-2016, Dutch Government, January 31, 2017.

Blog geschreven voor Stop Wapenhandel

Week 7 in 25 tweets

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In India was deze week een grote luchtmacht wapenbeurs Aero India. Op zondag werd deze gevolgd door IDEX in Aboe Dhabi. In Amsterdam was een bijeenkomst van Europese (inclusief Oekraïne) hotemetoten uit het materieelverwervingweereldje in een hotel. De wapenverkoop gaat onverdroten door.

Misschien was het meest opvallende toch wel de Keniaanse commotie rond de aanschaf van ongeschikte vliegtuigen uit de Verenigde Staten (zie week 6 voor de officiële bekendmaking daarvan) en de aandacht daarvoor in de VS en Kenia een week later.



Nederland (zie ook 4, 20)

1 – 140217: Broekstukken: Export of Dutch dual-use satellites in 2016 (in Dutch, English version later this week) Nederlands: http://bit.ly/2kr4tidEnglish: http://bit.ly/2lkTFS1
2 – 14/02/17: Het vijandsbeeld van Europa klopt niet http://bit.ly/2lRHFnZ
Oekraïne

3 – 140217: Is the international arms embargo ended? #Ukraine wants closer military ties with #Burma/#Myanmar, expert says http://bit.ly/2lMmFDx
4 – 160217: #Ukraine procurement officials now at #EDP, #Amsterdam. Recently named in IHS JDW (8/2) as part of Ukraines problems. http://bit.ly/2lOlUJZ

Oostenrijk
5 – 160217: #Austria sues #Airbus together with #EFA it illegally charged nearly 10 percent of the purchase price http://reut.rs/2lkSIto#corruption

Turkije

6 – 140217: #Turkey is part of #EU zone for arms trade licenses. So how can #conflict zones offer space for Turkish #APC sales? http://bit.ly/2lQjFT7

Midden-Oosten

7 – 190217: Defence industry in focus as Idex kicks off in Abu Dhabi http://bit.ly/2mbspCM 
Look for who's there at #IDEX2017 : http://bit.ly/2ly4TTY
     
Armenië

8 – 150217: #Armenian National Committee of America calls on State Department to oppose #Israeli Iron Dome sale to #Azerbaijan http://bit.ly/2mbqI8d

China

9 – 150217: Figures and viewpoint on global and East Asian military budgets, focussing on China. https://t.co/2vEUo9OLmV
India

10 – 13/02/17 Swedish defence giant #SAAB offers to build high-tech #jet production factory in #India. http://bit.ly/2lCuE5H

Indonesia

11 – 160217: The ghost chopper story continues: Another twist in Indonesia's puzzling AW101 helicopter buy: http://bit.ly/2lj6HNT

Kenia

12 – 160217: US House Representatives wants to block the January Arms trade sold to the #Kenyan Government! by @andrewfeinstein http://bit.ly/2kB6VCM

13 – 190217: Envoy Robert Godec clarifies #Kenya's #arms deal with #US - Daily Nation http://bit.ly/2lvHjH2

Myanmar/Birma

14 – 160217: Arms ban #Myanmar/#Birma still valid? More an more countries (India, #Pakistan, #Ukraine) do if it isn't. But it is! http://bit.ly/2kt2mKN

SM-3

15 – 140217: Belgium: The Next Missile Defense Superpower? http://bit.ly/2lnhecV

16 – 160217: The later you'll step in, the cheaper they are. Here’s how cost of each version of the #F35 #JSF is changing http://bit.ly/2kM84mi

Special Forces

17 – 13/02/17 #Renault Trucks Defence delivers heavy vehicles to #French special forces #SFhttp://bit.ly/2lccYNn

defensie-industrie

18 – 13/02/17 Military satellites, the Pentagon's industrial relations http://bit.ly/2lIPsFC

Airbus

19 – 13/02/17 SFO drops investigation against two key individuals in GPT/Airbus bribery allegations relating to Saudi Arabia: http://bit.ly/2l8aboW

Damen

20 – 160217: After #navy tugs, now #OPVs. #Damen and #SouthAfrica Shipyards in the lead to build new Navy hulls | defenceWeb http://bit.ly/2lZYcXS

Corruptie (zie ook 5, 11, 19)

21 – 170217: #Compensation deals for arms contracts are bad they make the price higher and open the door to #corruption.http://bit.ly/2kVqqlS

22 – 180217: #Corruption in defence-industry endemic. #Bulgaria's new interim government finds many irregular defence contracts http://bit.ly/2mbyTkS

Activisme en onderzoek

23 – 160217: Protest at European Defence Procurement lobby in Amsterdam hotel. Protest bij 'feestje van de wapenlobby' in Zuid https://t.co/PPwCa24XXX

24 – 150217: Stop the Cardiff arms fair! Full of activities. http://bit.ly/2l8QCfj

25 – 150217: Charges dropped for nine protesters against arms trade in New Zeland | Otago Daily Times Online News http://bit.ly/2kVFkbM

Week 8 in 25 tweets

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De afgelopen week kende twee wapenhandel hoogtepunten. De publicatie van het SIPRI rapport over de wereldwijde ontwikkelingen van de militaire uitgaven en de start van de wapenbeurs in Aboe Dhabi. Het een staat niet los van het andere. 


IDEX leverde een bedrag van US$ 5 miljard aan wapenorders op (niet gering op een bedrag van US$ 30 miljard per jaar). Jammer dat de Nederlandse pers niet even naar Nederland keek van (11 naar 12). Dat heeft stuivertje gewisseld met Israël (van 12 naar 11). http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_toplist.php

Nederland (zie ook Damen, Turkije)

1 – 210217: 'Dutch' (#Damen, #Thales) vessel in Abu Dhabi, #IDEX. Arialah takes a public bow [IDEX17D3] | IHS Jane's 360http://bit.ly/2mjxcX0

2 – 220217: Zo ziet de groei van de #wapenhandeleruit. Jammer dat een Nederlandse krant dat land er niet bijpakt.http://bit.ly/2lTPOvL

3 – 220217: Dutch #Damenin South #African#navalprograms: Local is lekker in shipping world - Times LIVEhttp://bit.ly/2lTNepr

Croatië

4 – 210217: Croatia exported $36 million worth of ammunition to Jordan 2 years after Syrian conflict began, $124 million to Saudi Arabia since 2014 http://bit.ly/2lJ5wt8

Italië

5 – 220217: MoU signed between #Italian#Berettaand Pakistan Ordnance Factories #POF

Turkije

6 – 260217: #Dutchgovernment defends exports of #F35#JSFcomponments to #Turkeybecause it is an ongoing project @HarryvandeSPhttp://bit.ly/2lY9X3W

7 – 260217: Proposed #missilepurchase in #Russiamay be a sign #Erdoganwants to reduce reliance on #NATOor a threat to do so.

Azerbaijan

8 – 210217: Lobby against arming #Azerbaijan, Japan Herald: Azerbaijan's arms imports 20 times higher than #Armenia's in 2012-16 http://bit.ly/2lJlRfF

9 – 210217: Lobby in Jerusalem Post for arms to #Azerbaijan‘It’s time for the US Congress to scrap the sanctions on Azerbaijan’ http://bit.ly/2lnvCiE

China

10 – 230217: US arms trade to Asia as reported by SIPRI and NATO 2% demand seen from Chinese eyes. http://bit.ly/2lJayFT

Israel

11 – 260217: #Indiaclears Rs 17,000 crore (€ 2.415 billion) mega-#missiledeal with #Israelhttps://goo.gl/A8cYhD via @TimesNowhttp://bit.ly/2lJiCVx

Pakistan

12 – 260217: #Pakistanon equipment buying spree in US, US, US, Italy, Russia, Turkey etc.http://bit.ly/2lYusO8

Yemen

13 – 230217: #Brazil's #Taurusshipped hand guns to son of #Yemenismuggler: U.N. report | TODAYonlinehttp://bit.ly/2ms2k3j

kleine wapens

14 – 220217: #Kalashnikovsales soar in Middle East / no company in the #SIPRItop defense 100 that is making purely small armshttp://bit.ly/2lde6g6

Defensie-industrie

Damen (zie ook Nederland)

15 – 230217: Dutch pride. #Damenextended SIGMA family [#IDEX17 D5] | IHS Jane's 360 http://bit.ly/2lYerYh

16 – 230217: Defense News on New #UAEpatrol ship build by Dutch #Damen, it "presents a striking profile" http://bit.ly/2mz28i7

17 – 220217: Hoe onze spionagetechnologie in verkeerde handen valt via @decorrespondenthttp://bit.ly/2ldbfDW


Airbus (zie ook corruptie)

18 – 230217: BBC News - Military #A400Mtransport plane cost hits #Airbusprofitshttp://bit.ly/2lnL1PQ

corruptie

19 – 210217: #Airbusdenies Austrian fraud allegations over Eurofighter #Typhoondeal http://bit.ly/2ms2lEw

IDEX2017

20 – 260217: #NYToverview of arms fair #IDEX: At a ‘Defense’ Expo, an Antiseptic World of Weaponryhttp://bit.ly/2mz7SZb

21 – 260217: gulftoday.ae | IDEX concludes with over Dhs19b (€ 4.9b) deals http://bit.ly/2ms1P9r

22 – 220217: #Sudanemerges as 3rd largest arms producer in Africa at major ams show #IDEX#armstrade

23 – 220217: #IDEX2017: #Raytheonto keep focus on region despite US-imposed #Saudiarms deal suspension https://t.co/a54LxAbFCmvia @TheNationalUAE

Activisme en Onderzoek

24 – 260217: Increase in arms transfers driven by demand in the Middle East and Asia, says #SIPRIhttp://bit.ly/2mjvCnN

25 – 260217: And the world's biggest arms dealer is ... http://bit.ly/2mjF6zC via @CNNMoney


Belgian and Dutch participation in missile defence

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The Dutch and Belgian naval forces are deeply integrated. Recently the two countries decided to aim for identical new frigates for an anti-submarine role, according to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The project is in its early stages. Belgium allocated € 1 billion euro's to the project and the Netherlands € 730 million. The financial difference may reflect that Belgium wants to add an anti-missile missile shooter capability for its frigates as a part of the missile shield.

The missile shield, (not to be mixed up with the Star Wars or Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, introduced under Ronald Reagan as part of the Cold War arms race, which made Russia implode economically and made the US end up with an enormous deficit), was made possible when neoconservative Bush jr decided to withdraw from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and the focus shifted to smaller and more diverse units (ALTBMD) under the pragmatic President Obama.
Steps by those US presidents were followed by NATO member states, and played an important role in growing tension between Russia and NATO. Although NATO Secretaries General said time and time again that the system was not aimed against Russia but against North Korea and Iran, Moscow felt that it disturbed the nuclear balance. The missile shield undermines the possibility of Russia to use it's ballistic missiles, the most important weaponry against a conventionally much stronger NATO. At the same time Russia sees NATO influence marching with great speed to the Russian border.
Russia responded to the development of the missile shield by assigning elements of it as nuclear target, as in 2000 at the opening of the Vardo radar station in Norway(see). But also more recently against the ALTBMD development under Obama. In 2015 the Russian ambassador in Denmark openly wondered if Copenhagen realised that the consequences of missile defence technology on naval vessels was that the Danish ships could be targeted by Russian nuclear missiles.
The missile shield is based in space, on land and at sea. The installations on land, such as in Poland en Romania, get the most attention. Identical weapons are stationed at sea. They are not just mobile, but also much less visible to the press and public. As one website reported: "Belgium has quitely made the decission to build frigates equiped with exoatmospheric intercepters that sound a lot like the US Navy Aegis system."
The missile
The interceptors the Belgians want on their new frigates is the so-called SM-3 missile made by US Raytheon. Those are chosen as the main system of the missile defence effort against ballistic missiles with an intermediate range (IRBM, listed by Wikipedia from 11.500km to 500km). The SM-3 missiles are 6.5 meters long chunks of steel and weight 1,5 tons. They are fired with a speed of 16,000 km p/h. The price tag is between € 10 million and € 24 million each! Such missiles were prohibited under the ABM Treaty. They are now ready for launch in Poland and Romania and also in many naval vessels.
In October 2016 the Russians analysed the capabilities of the SM-3 missile and found that they can target missiles from submarines and ICBMs in flight, but also in the initial stage of the flight. According to the Russian general Poznikhir this leads to a "serious threat to the nuclear potentials of Russia and China," as the SM-3 is able to hit missiles before the warheads separate, making the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) ineffective. For the Russians, such a balance-disturbing missile is a serious treath. The missiles can also play a role against satellites in lower space with their predictable courses as easy to hit as sitting ducks. Being able to hit satellites is an important quality now the role of space in waging war increases.

The radar
But before a missile sets course to it goal this target must be identified, and here comes the Dutch role in the missile defence. For this you need a radar such as the Smart-L Early Warning Capability (EWC) system of Thales Netherland. That version of the SMART-L radar currently is provided to four Dutch LCF air defence frigates and will give the Netherlands a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) sensor capacity by 2020. 'Unrivalled' coins Thales Netherlands the radar itself. It is praised in defence circles, and even South Korea – located in the American sphere of influence – has SMART-L installed on one of its ships. Total units around is 26 in several variants (see table).

Ship class
Operator
Variant
Total units
 Royal Netherlands Navy
Smart-L EWC
4
 Deutsche Marine
Smart-L
3
 Royal Navy
S1850M
6
 Royal Navy
S1850M
2
 French Navy
S1850M
2
 Italian Navy
S1850M
2
ROK Navy(South Korea)
Smart-L
4
 Royal Danish Navy
Smart-L
3
Royal Netherlands Air Force
Smart-L EWC Ground Based
2
Total


26
Bron: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMART-L
Belgium
Belgium will equip its new M-class frigates with a shooting capability and the missiles themselves (provided others join, otherwise this will be too expensive), writes newspaper De Morgen. On page 148 of the Belgian Strategic Vision it is stated: "Our frigates will if needed be turned into a Ballistic Missile Defense system since they will be able to fire missiles to ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. This will be in co-operation need to be done with radar systems that are capable of long distance detection on board, for example, an air defence frigate."
This makes the combination of the Dutch and Belgium navy a fully fledged player in the missile shield. Dutch ships can track and guide, but not fire by themselves. The Dutch Minister of Defence stated in January 2017 that expansion of the strength by introducing a shooter capacity for the Netherlands may come later.
The US Naval Institute published an article which stated in February 2017: "The question facing the Trump administration on European ballistic missile defence is, should the United State go ahead with the next phase of the program or pause to let serious discussion with the Russia beginning on nuclear proliferation and arms control." To refresh the good old arms control system seems the best idea, as missile defence might lead to a renewal of a nuclear arms race.

MB feb 2017
Geschreven voor Stop Wapenhandel

Week 9 in 25 tweets

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 De week begon met een gedetailleerd blootleggen van Nederlandse corruptie bij de aanleg van Saoedische militaire vliegvelden met de omvang van € 330 miljoen. Een zaak die met de mantel der financiële schikking afgedekt werd.

Nederland (zie ook 21)

1 – 270217: Retweet Andrew Feinstein: Dutch company pays huge bribe to Saudis. Gr8 investigative work by Dutch TV journos

2 - 020317: Dutch report: Six Dutch insurance companies invest in arms manufacturers selling arms to Saudi's. http://bit.ly/2lRx6Sh

Europa

3- 020317: Defence budget growth or decline in 2016. See for yourself. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C56Pjo2XQAA3szQ.jpg

4 – 040317: #EU countries selling MILLIONS of pounds of arms to MENA - especially Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt, Israel, etc http://bit.ly/2lv943w

Oekraïne

5 – 010317: The pot calling the kettle black. Russian diplomat warns US arms deliveries to #Ukraine may turn into new tragedies. http://bit.ly/2n4SBzx

Overige landen

China

6 - 040317: #China enters new era of weaponry with increase in #arms #exports. Recent estimates may be exaggerated, but ... https://sputniknews.com/asia/201703031051240190-china-weapons-exports/

7 – 010317: Bigger #Pentagon #budget ‘could challenge #China’. Chinese analists warn against overreacting. http://bit.ly/2lv3LwP  via @SCMP_News

Egypte

8 – 270217: Looks useful for internal repression. #IDEX 2017: #Minerva in #Dubai #MSPV confirms large #Egyptian vehicle order. http://bit.ly/2muRyfD

VS

9 – 040317: Why does the US continue to arm terrorists in Syria? via @thenation http://bit.ly/2mv1R2Y

Midden-Oosten (zie ook 4)

10 – 030317: "We are slowly but surely seeing a reshaping of the competitive dynamics in 1 of the most important export markets"http://bit.ly/2lRGi9e

Sahel

11 – 040317: Retweet Nils Duquet, Some of these many uncontrolled weapons currently trafficked in Sahel might in near future also fuel black market in Europe #projectSAFTE http://bit.ly/2mKThOd

wapens

Drones

12 – 270217: #Report: UK #Drone #Ops Against #ISIS: suggesting 1200 strikes without killing/injuring 1 #civilian is dangerous. http://bit.ly/2lN8N7r

13 – 280217: China says it has received its largest foreign drone order: Xinhua http://bit.ly/2n51VTT via @Reuters

14 – 030317: Looks like Saudi just bought 300 armed UAVs from China - dwarfs UK or French numbers... http://bit.ly/2mKQipe

F-35 (JSF)

15 – 270217: US Air Force anticipates #JSF #F35 deployment to Middle East in 'not too distant future'http://bit.ly/2mVTZFs

16 – 010317: It took seven days for 10 US Marine Corps #JSF #F35 to fly from Yuma to their new home at Iwakuni, #Japan http://bit.ly/2ma6w82 Why ...

Raketschild

17 – 010317: Belgian and Dutch participation in missile defence http://www.stopwapenhandel.org/node/2022 

Corruptie

Bulgarije

18 – 270217: #Bulgaria's former defense minister put on #trial amid #procurement irregularity allegations #corruption http://bit.ly/2mKJurI

Israël

19 – 010317: #Israel to probe #German #submarine purchase #corruption https://t.co/bdtm7n6QME

Roemenië

20 – 020317: #Damen irregularities. #Romania plans to bolster army after budget hike :: Balkan Insight #Corruption http://bit.ly/2lRzhW5

Saoedi-Arabië

21 – 270217: Dutch TV on #corruption between Saudi Royal family/Duch Balast Nedam involving over € 500 m for militairy air fields. http://bit.ly/2mKDHSW

Defensie-industrie

22 – 010317: #Thales earnings rise amid prospects of a European defense uptick http://bit.ly/2mKTL7d

Investeren

23 – 040317: 'Ethical investment' the bible belt way: no gay related investement, but oil and arms are fine. https://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/invest-bible-fund-backs-arms-122318275.html … via @YahooSG

Activisme en Onderzoek

24 – 010317: Walk through Brussels March 26 14-16h to hear about arms industry lobby. http://bit.ly/2n4Laby

25 – 030317: Belgium debate on arms trade was sold out, but now to watch @Vredesactie @andrewfeinstein @smhwpf @deBuren #*MO http://bit.ly/2mabK3G

US Defense Contracts with Dutch participation 2016

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Release No: CR-245-16, Dec. 22, 2016

NAVY
Raytheon Co., Tuscon, Arizona, is being awarded a $23,412,991 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-16-C-5433) to procure Evolved Seasparrow Missile (ESSM) design agent, in-service support, and technical engineering support services. These requirements support the ESSM production. The ESSM program is an international cooperative effort to design, develop, test, and procure ESSM missiles. The ESSM provides enhanced ship defense. This is a sole-source contract pursuant to an international agreement between the U.S. and nine other countries. Work will be performed in Tuscon, Arizona (72 percent); Raufoss, Norway (7 percent); Ottobrunn, Germany (7 percent); Hengelo OV, Netherlands (5 percent); Richmond, Australia (4 percent); Mississauga, Canada (2 percent); Madrid, Spain (1 percent); Ankara, Turkey (1 percent); Grenaa, Denmark; and Koropi, Greece (less than 1 percent each), and is expected to be completed by December 2017. Fiscal 2017 other procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $9,297,886 will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-243-16, Dec. 20, 2016

ARMY
Raytheon, Andover, Massachusetts, was awarded a $27,456,865 modification (P00048) to foreign military sales contract W31P4Q-13-C-0111 (Israel, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, Netherlands) for depot level diagnosis and repair capability for PATRIOTsecondary items.  Work will be performed in Andover, Massachusetts, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 30, 2019.  Fiscal 2017 other funds in the amount of $27,456,866 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-235-16, Dec. 8, 2016

AIR FORCE
Leidos Inc., Reston, Virginia, has been awarded a $350,000,000 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) engineering integration. Contractor will provide delivery of the JMPS Mission Planning Environment and JMPS Integrated Build Environments. Work will be primarily performed at Reston, Virginia; and Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be complete by Dec. 7, 2027. This contract involves foreign military sales to Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Korea, Morocco, NATO, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and United Kingdom. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition with one offer received. Fiscal 2016 and 2017 research, development, test and evaluation; operations and maintenance; procurement; and foreign military sales funds in the amount of $9,392,996 are being obligated at the time of award on the first two delivery orders. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, is the contracting activity (FA8730-17-F-0053).

Release No: CR-223-16, Nov. 21, 2016

ARMY
The Boeing Co., Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, was awarded a $13,877,016 modification (P00052) to foreign military sales (Netherlands) contract W58RGZ-13-C-0002 for CH-47F Chinook cargo helicopter support services.  Work will be performed in Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2020.  Fiscal 2016 other funds in the amount of $13,877,016 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-220-16, Nov. 16, 2016

ARMY
Lockheed Martin Corp., Orlando, Florida, was awarded a $12,282,400 modification (P00031) to foreign military sales (Saudi Arabia, Italy, Pakistan, Netherlands, and Jordan) contract W31P4Q-15-C-0043 to exercise option two for 100 Hellfire M299 launchers.  Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, with an estimated completion date of May 31, 2019.  Multiple fiscal year other funds in the amount of $12,282,400 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-213-16, Nov. 4, 2016

NAVY
Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is being awarded a $177,929,800 firm-fixed-priced, cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-16-C-5408 for the procurement of multi-year fiscal 2016-2017  Evolved Seasparrow Missiles Block I production requirements.  Under the terms of the modification, Raytheon Missile Systems will provide 186 all up rounds, inert operation missiles, spare components, shipping containers, and provide other production related support.  This contract modification includes foreign military sales to Spain, Thailand, and United Arab Emirates.  Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (32 percent); Germany (11 percent); Australia (9 percent); Andover, Massachusetts (7 percent); Canada (6 percent); Norway (5 percent); Spain (4 percent); Keyser, West Virginia (4 percent); Netherlands(4 percent); San Jose, California (3 percent); McKinney, Texas (3 percent); Turkey (2 percent); Cincinnati, Ohio (2 percent); Greece (1 percent); Mountain View, California (1 percent); various places below one percent (6 percent), and is expected to be completed by March 2020.  Fiscal 2016 weapons procurement (Navy); fiscal 2016 other procurement (Navy); and Navy foreign military sales funding in the amount of 125,219,436 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-194-16, Oct. 7, 2016

NAVY
BAE Systems Information and Electronic Systems Integration Inc., Hudson, New Hampshire, is being awarded a not-to-exceed $618,343,700 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for the procurement of Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II full-rate production Lots 5 through 7 in support of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, and governments of Iraq, Lebanon, Netherlands, Jordan, and Australia under the Foreign Military Sales program.  This effort will include WGU-59/B units to upgrade the current 2.75-inch rocket system to a semi-active laser guided precision weapon.  Work will be performed in Nashua, New Hampshire (70 percent); and Austin, Texas (30 percent), and is expected to be completed in December 2018.  Funds will not be obligated at time of award. Funding will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued.  This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c) (1).  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-17-D-5517).

Release No: CR-188-16, Sept. 29, 2016

NAVY
Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a not-to-exceed $16,497,297 modification to delivery order 0031 previously placed against basic ordering agreement N00019-14-G-0020.  This modification provides for deployable spares packages in support of the low-rate initial production Lot 9 F-35B aircraft for the Marine Corps.  Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (24.4 percent); El Segundo, California (9 percent); Owego, New York (8.6 percent); Samlesbury, United Kingdom (7.2 percent); Cheltenham, United Kingdom (6.2 percent); Nashua, New Hampshire (5.8 percent); Torrance, California (5.5 percent); Orlando, Florida (4.9 percent); Cedar Rapids, Iowa (3.7 percent); San Diego, California (3.6 percent); Phoenix, Arizona (3.1 percent); Melbourne, Florida (3 percent); Irvine, California (2.5 percent); North Amityville, New York (2.4 percent); Windsor Locks, Connecticut (2.2 percent); Baltimore, Maryland (2.2 percent); Papendrect (sic! Papendrecht), Netherlands (1.9 percent); Rolling Meadows, Illinois (1.8 percent); and Alpharetta, Georgia (1.8 percent), and is expected to be completed in July 2020.  Fiscal 2016 aircraft procurement (Navy/Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $16,497,297 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, is being awarded a $9,525,651 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-16-C-5418) for the NATO Seasparrow MissileSystem (NSSMS) design agent engineering and technical support.  The contractor shall provide a variety of design agent program management, engineering, technical and logistics services and supplies necessary to provide effective life cycle support and modernization of the NATO Seasparrow Project Office Combat System Division portfolio, which includes the MK 57 NATO Seasparrow Surface Missile System, the MK 48/56 Guided Missile Vertical Launch System, MK 41 Vertical Launch System related software and equipment, and a variety of lab and special test equipment.  This contract combines purchases for the Navy and the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey as part of the NATO Seasparrow consortium.  The Navy share is 40 percent of the program; the partner nations will combine for 60 percent of the program.  Work will be performed in Portsmouth, Rhode Island (94 percent); Marlborough, Massachusetts (3 percent); and San Diego, California (3 percent); and is expected to be completed by November 2017.  Fiscal 2016 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy); and fiscal 2016 other procurement (Navy) funding in the amount of $7,609,227 will be obligated at time of award; none of the will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity.

Raytheon, IDS, Andover, Massachusetts, was awarded a $35,650,000 firm-fixed- price foreign military sales contract (German, Netherlands, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates) for PDB-8 kits for U.S. and foreign military sales requirements. Bids were solicited on the Internet with one received. Work will be performed in multiple locations, with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2018. Fiscal 2016 operations and maintenance Army funds in the amount of $35, 650,000 were obligated at the time of award. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-16-C-0135).

Release No: CR-187-16, Sept. 28, 2016

Barber-Nichols Inc.,* Arvada, Colorado, is being awarded a $10,744,868 firm-fixed-price modification under a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost, firm-fixed-price contract (N66604-15-C-3045) to exercise options for production of alternators and regulators and long lead material in support of the Mk 48 Mod 6 and Mod 7 Heavyweight Torpedo Program.  The Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedo is the Navy’s primary submarine launched anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare weapon.  This option involves foreign military sales to the governments of Canada, The Netherlands, and Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales program.  Work will be performed in Arvada, Colorado, and is expected to be completed by December 2017.  Foreign military sales funds in the amount of $10,744,868 are being obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Division Newport, Rhode Island, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-180-16, Sept. 19, 2016

Honeywell International Inc., Clearwater, Florida, was awarded a $12,984,800 modification (P4V06) to foreign military sales (Qatar, Netherlands, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico) contract FA8540-13-D-0002 for procurement of 139 production units of embedded global positioning system/inertial navigation system.  Work will be performed in the aforementioned countries with an estimated completion date of June 1, 2019.  Fiscal 2016 other funds in the amount of $12,984,800 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-179-16, Sept. 16, 2016

NAVY
Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a not-to-exceed $136,588,895 for firm-fixed-price delivery order 0001 against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-14-G-0020).  This modification provides for low-rate initial production Lot 10 air vehicle initial spares to include F-35 common spares; F-35A, F-35B and F-35C unique spares; and aloft spares packages/deployment spares packages required to support the air vehicle delivery schedule for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, as well as non-Department of Defense (DoD) participants and Foreign Military Sales customers.  Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (24.4 percent); El Segundo, California (9 percent); Owego, New York (8.6 percent); Samlesbury, United Kingdom (7.2 percent); Cheltenham, United Kingdom (6.2 percent); Nashua, New Hampshire (5.8 percent); Torrance, California (5.5 percent); Orlando, Florida (4.9 percent); Cedar Rapids, Iowa (3.7 percent); San Diego, California (3.6 percent); Phoenix, Arizona (3.1 percent); Melbourne, Florida (3 percent); Irvine, California (2.5 percent); North Amityville, New York (2.4 percent); Windsor Locks, Connecticut (2.2 percent); Baltimore, Maryland (2.2 percent); Papendrect (sic!), Netherlands (1.9 percent); Rolling Meadows, Illinois (1.8 percent); and Alpharetta, Georgia (1.8 percent), and is expected to be completed in December 2019.  Fiscal 2016 aircraft procurement (Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $89,299,340 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  This delivery order combines purchases for the Air Force ($52,280,750; 38.3 percent); Navy ($1,303,033; 1 percent); Marine Corps ($35,715,557; 26.1 percent); non-DoD participants ($27,755,423; 20.3 percent); and Foreign Military Sales ($19,534,133; 14.3 percent).  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a not-to-exceed $26,450,000 modification to firm-fixed-price delivery order 0031 against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-14-G-0020).  This modification provides for low-rate initial production Lot 9 air vehicle initial spares to include F-35B aloft spares packages required to support the air vehicle delivery schedule for the Marine Corps.  Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (24.4 percent); El Segundo, California (9 percent); Owego, New York (8.6 percent); Samlesbury, United Kingdom (7.2 percent); Cheltenham, United Kingdom (6.2 percent); Nashua, New Hampshire (5.8 percent); Torrance, California (5.5 percent); Orlando, Florida (4.9 percent); Cedar Rapids, Iowa (3.7 percent); San Diego, California (3.6 percent); Phoenix, Arizona (3.1 percent); Melbourne, Florida (3.0 percent); Irvine, California (2.5 percent); North Amityville, New York (2.4 percent); Windsor Locks, Connecticut (2.2 percent); Baltimore, Maryland (2.2 percent); Papendrect, Netherlands (1.9 percent); Rolling Meadows, Illinois (1.8 percent); and Alpharetta, Georgia (1.8 percent), and is expected to be completed in March 2020.  Fiscal 2016 aircraft procurement (Navy/Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $26,450,000 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-174-16, Sept. 9, 2016

AIR FORCE
Atlantic CommTech Corp. (ACT-Corp), Norfolk, Virginia, has been awarded a $36,460,575 firm-fixed price with cost reimbursable travel contract line items contract for a sustainment effort to modernize the Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3) and Alarm Communication and Display (AC&D). This contract provides for sustainment upgrades to the WS3 cryptographic system used to encrypt WS3 alarm data, and will perform an AC&D system upgrade by replacing obsolete components and the buried cable. The locations of performance are Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany; Aviano AB, Italy; Buechel AB, Germany; Ghedi AB, Italy; Incirlik AB, Turkey; Kleine Brogel AB, Belgium; and Volkel AB, Netherlands. The work is expected to be completed by Oct. 22, 2020. This award is a result of a competitive small business set-aside with three offers received. Fiscal 2016 other procurement in the amount of $7,159,114 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is the contracting activity (FA9422-16-C-8041).

Release No: CR-158-16, Aug. 17, 2016

NAVY
Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is being awarded $7,183,247 for modification P00012 to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (N00019-15-D-0028) to procure additional AIM-9X Sidewinder repairs for the Air Force, and Navy, and the governments of South Korea, Singapore, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Poland, Oman, Netherlands, Australia, Kuwait, Morocco, Belgium, and Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales program.  Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona, and is expected to be completed in September 2018.  No funds will be obligated at time of award.  Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued.  This contract combines purchases for Air Force ($2,973,100, 41.39 percent); Navy ($2,556,866; 35.59 percent); and the governments of South Korea ($302,312, 4.21 percent); Singapore ($301,052, 4.19 percent); Finland ($252,274, 3.51 percent); Denmark ($155,551, 2.17 percent); Switzerland ($138,174, 1.93 percent); Poland ($98,816, 1.38 percent); Oman ($81,439, 1.13 percent); Netherlands ($81,439, 1.13 percent); Australia ($79,346, 1.10 percent); Kuwait ($74,112, 1.03 percent); Morocco ($32,031, .45 percent); Belgium ($32,031, .45 percent), and Turkey ($24,704, .34 percent).  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-126-16, July 1, 2016

NAVY
Raytheon Co., Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is being awarded $291,750,539 for modification P00015 to a previously awarded fixed-price-incentive-firm contract (N00019-15-C-0092) for procurement of 660 AIM-9X Block II All Up Round Tactical Full Rate Production Lot 16 Missiles for the Navy (160), Air Force (429), Army (7) and the governments of Japan (4), Norway (20) and Taiwan (40).  In addition, this modification provides for the procurement of 252 Block II Captive Air Training Missiles for the Navy (47), Air Force (77), and the governments of Japan (6), Norway (30), Turkey (18), Australia (20), Australia (14), and Taiwan (40); 13 Special Air Training Missiles for the U.S. Army (12) and the Government of the Netherlands (1); 274 All Up Round Containers for the Navy (59), Air Force (142), Army (8) and the governments of Japan (4), Norway (16), Turkey (5), Netherlands (1), Australia (16), and Taiwan (23); 15 Captive Test Missiles for the Navy (6), Air Force (7) and Army (2); one Lot of classified assets for the Government of Australia ; 22 Spare Advanced Optical Target Detectors for the Navy (17), Air Force (3), the governments of Norway (1) and South Korea (1); 30 Spare Guidance Units (Live Battery) for the Navy (14), Air Force (10), and the governments of Norway (2) and S. Korea (4); 30 Spare Captive Air Training Missile Guidance Units for the Navy (11), Air Force (2) and the governments of Norway (6), Turkey (2), and Australia (9); 27 Guidance Unit Containers for the Navy (5), Air Force (2) and the governments of Norway (7), Turkey (1), S. Korea (3), and Australia (9); 14 Spare Advanced Optical Target Detector Containers for the Navy (10), Air Force (1), and the governments of Norway (1), South Korea (1) and Belgium (1); two Spare Block 1 Propulsion Steering Sections for the governments of Turkey (1) and Denmark (1); four Spare Block II Propulsion Steering Sections for the governments of South Korea (3) and Taiwan (1); spares for the Navy, Air Force and 16 lots of spares for the governments of  Finland (1), Denmark (1), Australia (1), Japan (1), Israel (1), Turkey (1), Netherlands (1), Singapore (1), Malaysia (1), Oman (1), Switzerland (1), South Korea (1), Romania (1), Belgium (1), Kuwait (1), and Saudi Arabia (1).  Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (43.74 percent); Andover, Massachusetts (10.08 percent); Valencia, California (6.63 percent); Ontario Canada, Midland (5.54 percent); Rocket Center, West Virginia (5.49 percent); Vancouver, Washington (5.07 percent); Goleta, California (2.86 percent); Cheshire, Connecticut (2.05 percent); Heilbronn, Germany (1.88 percent); Simsbury, Connecticut (1.61 percent); San Jose, California (1.48 percent); Anniston, Alabama (1.31 percent); Cincinnati, Ohio (1.22 percent); Maniago, Italy (1.21 percent); Chatsworth, California (1.11 percent); San Diego, California (1.04 percent); Montgomery, Alabama (0.60 percent); Orlando, Florida (0.55 percent); Newbury Park, California (0.50 percent); El Segundo, California (0.50 percent); Claremont, California (0.43 percent); Joplin, Missouri (0.39 percent); Lombard, Illinois (.28 percent); El Cajon, California (0.15 percent), and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (4.28 percent). Work is expected to be completed in March 2019.  Fiscal 2016 missile procurement (Air Force); fiscal 2016 weapons procurement (Navy); fiscal 2016 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy, Army, Air Force); and foreign military sales funds in the amount of $291,750,539 are being obligated on this award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Air Force ($183,136,307; 62.77 percent), the Navy ($78,031,949; 26.74 percent); the Army ($7,776,729; 2.67 percent); and the governments of Australia ($10,785,852; 3.7 percent); Turkey ($4,649,073; 1.59 percent); Korea ($1,892,805; .65 percent); Japan ($1,548,798; .53 percent); Kuwait ($786,690; .27 percent); Saudi Arabia ($770,719; .26 percent); Denmark ($544,845; .19 percent); the Netherlands($428,610; .15 percent); Switzerland ($328,454; .11 percent); Malaysia ($280,803; .10 percent); Israel ($207,760; .07 percent); Oman ($208,253; .07 percent); Belgium ($197,614; .07 percent); Finland ($105,248; .04 percent); Singapore ($53,808; .01 percent), and Romania ($16,222; .01 percent) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-124-16, June 30, 2016

NAVY
Raytheon Co., Tucson, Arizona, is being awarded a $23,796,465 cost-plus-fixed fee contract for Evolved SEASPARROW Missile (ESSM) Design Agent, In-Service Support (ISS), Technical Engineering Support Services (TESS) and Block 2 Risk Reduction Support.  The ESSM program is an international cooperative effort to design, develop, test, and procure ESSM missiles.  The ESSM provides enhanced ship defense.  This is a sole-source award pursuant to an international agreement between the United States and nine other countries.  This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $197,269,648.  This contract utilizes funding from the NATO SEASPARROW Consortium, utilizing funding as follows: U.S. Navy (48.87 percent); the Government of Germany (12.65 percent); the Government of Australia (11.26 percent); the Government of Canada (9.67 percent); the Government of the Netherlands (4.09 percent); the Government of Norway (3.67 percent); the Government of Turkey (2.95 percent); the Government of Denmark (2.40 percent); the Government of Greece (1.97 percent); the Government of Japan (1.45 percent); and the Government of Spain (1.02 percent), in the base period of performance.  Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (90.62 percent); Hengelo OV, Netherlands (2.31 percent); Raufoss, Norway (2.27 percent); Ottobrunn, Germany (1.18 percent); Richmond, Australia (1.18 percent); Rocket Center, West Virginia (0.79 percent); Mississauga, Canada (0.70 percent); Madrid, Spain (0.51 percent); Ankara, Turkey (0.30 percent); and Koropi, Greece (0.14 percent), and is expected to be completed by December 2016.  Fiscal 2016 other procurement (Navy); fiscal 2016 weapons procurement (Navy); fiscal 2016 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy); fiscal 2016 operations and maintenance (Navy); and fiscal 2016 foreign military sales in the amount of $13,740,589 will be obligated at time of award with $728,880 expiring at the end of the current fiscal year.  This contract was not competitively procured is accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(4) - International Agreement.  The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-16-C-5433).

ARMY
Raytheon Co., Tucson, Arizona, was awarded a $7,863,440 modification (P00071) to foreign military sales contract W15QKN-08-C-0530 (Netherlands) for 155mm projectiles.  Work will be performed in  Tucson, Arizona; McAlester, Oklahoma; Farmington, New Mexico; East Camden, Arkansas; Healdsburg, California; Anniston, Alabama; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Joplin, Missouri; Lowell, Massachusetts; Corona, California; Inglewood, California: Chino, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Santa Ana, California; McKinney, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; Woodridge, Illinois; Valencia, California; Salt Lake City, Utah; Tucson, Arizona; Congers, New York; Karlskoga, Sweden; Southway, Plymouth, U.K; Glenrothes, U.K.  The estimated completion date is June 30, 2017.  Fiscal 2016 other procurement funds in the amount of $7,863,440.00 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-122-16, June 28, 2016

ARMY
Sunrise Beach Corp.,* McKinney, Texas, was awarded a $10,640,045 modification (P00035) to foreign military sales contract W58RGZ-13-C-0079 (Netherlands) for unit field and sustainment level maintenance activitiesincluding inspection, maintenance, preservation, corrosion control, avionics and component removal and repair.  Work will be performed in McKinney, Texas, with an estimated completion date of June 30, 2017.  Fiscal 2016 other procurement funds in the amount of $10,640,000 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-103-16, June 1, 2016

AIR FORCE
L-3 Communications, Vertex Aerospace LLC (L-3), Madison, Mississippi, has been awarded a $1,910,525,014 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for KC/KDC-10 airframe contractor logistics support. Contractor will provide logistics integration and support to include contractor operated and maintained base supply, aircraft maintenance to include depot and contractor field teams, and also modifications for service bulletins and time compliance technical orders. The contractor will also support the KDC-10 including the Remote Aerial Refueling Operator System for the Netherlands. The contractor will provide all support required to fulfill this requirement, including but not limited to labor, materials, tools, equipment, parts and transportation. Work will be performed at Travis Air Force Base, California; McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey; Greensboro, North Carolina; and the Netherlands, and is expected to be complete by June 30, 2025. This contract involves foreign military sales. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition with four offers received. Fiscal 2016 operation and maintenance funds in the amount of $4,116,764 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, is the contracting activity (FA8105-16-D-0003).

Release No: CR-095-16, May 19, 2016

ARMY
Intuitive Research and Technology Corp.,* Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $9,474,491 modification (0003B6) to foreign military sales contract W31P4Q-07-A-0015 (Netherlands, India, Latvia, Norway, Chile, Egypt, Finland, Iraq, Qatar, Korea) to furnish programmatic services for the Cruise Missile Defense System Project Office.  Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama, with an estimated completion date of May 19, 2016.  Fiscal 2016 and 2017 research, development, testing, and evaluation; and other procurement funds in the amount of $9,474,491 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-090-16, May 12, 2016

NAVY
Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $31,100,000 fixed-price, incentive (firm target) modification to a previously awarded advance acquisition contract (N00019-16-C-0033).  This modification provides for long lead time materials, parts, components and effort required to maintain the planned production schedule for eight F-35A low-rate initial production Lot 12 F-35A air vehicles for TheNetherlands.  Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (55 percent); El Segundo, California (15 percent); Warton, United Kingdom (10 percent); Orlando, Florida (5 percent); Nashua, New Hampshire (5 percent); Baltimore, Maryland (5 percent); and Cameri, Italy (5 percent), and is expected to be completed in March 2021.  Non-U.S. Department of Defense participant funds in the amount of $31,100,000 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the fiscal year.  The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.


Release No: CR-089-16, May 11, 2016

NAVY
Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is being awarded a $76,070,200 cost contract for the procurement of long lead material in support of the multi-year contract for fiscal 2016, 2017, and 2018 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) Block I production requirements. The ESSM program is an international cooperative effort to design, develop, test, and procure ESSM missiles.  The ESSM provides enhanced ship defense.  This contract combines purchases for the Navy (16 percent); and the governments of Australia, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, and Norway (partner nations combined are 84 percent total) as part of the NATO Sea Sparrow Consortium.  Work will be performed in Germany (30 percent); Norway (26.8 percent); Australia (15.5 percent); Tucson, Arizona (7 percent); Mountain View, California (3.0 percent); Cincinnati, Ohio (2.6 percent); San Diego, California (2.1 percent); McKinney, Texas (1.7 percent); Denmark (1.3 percent); and Santa Ana, California (0.1 percent), and is expected to be completed by May 2018.  Fiscal 2016 weapons procurement (Navy); foreign military sales; and international funds in the amount of $76,070,200 will be obligated at time of award, and contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-4 (10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(4)), international agreement. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-16-C-5408).

Release No: CR-082-16, May 2, 2016

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
BP Products North America, Chicago, Illinois, has been awarded a maximum $224,194,499 fixed-price with economic price adjustment contract for aviation turbine fuel. This was a competitive acquisition with 10 responses received. This is a one-year contract with a 30-day carry over period. Locations of performance are Illinois and the Netherlands, with a July 31, 2017, performance completion date. Using customer is Defense Logistics Agency Energy. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2016 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (SPE600-16-D-0480).

Release No: CR-036-16, Feb. 26, 2016

ARMY
Intuitive Research and Technology Corp., Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $29,058,284 modification (000456) to foreign military sales contract (Germany, Netherlands, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, Taiwan, Greece, Korea, United Arab Emirates, Qatar) W31P4Q-07-A-0015 for support of the lower tier project office missile systems[formerly Patriot?, MB] independent integration analysis.  Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama, with an estimated completion date of Feb. 28, 2017.  Fiscal 2016 other procurement funds in the amount of $29,058,286 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-017-16, Jan. 29, 2016

ARMY
Raytheon IDS, Andover, Massachusetts, was awarded a $212,687,782 modification (P00022) to foreign military sales contract W31P4Q-14-C-0093 (Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,Netherlands, Qatar, Spain, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates) for engineering services for calendar year 2016 for the PATRIOT program. Work will be performed in Andover, Massachusetts; Billerica, Massachusetts; Burlington, Massachusetts; El Segundo, California; El Paso, Texas; Huntsville, Alabama; Indianapolis, Indiana; Lawton, Oklahoma; Nashua, New Hampshire; Pelham, New Hampshire; Tewksbury, Massachusetts; and White Sands, New Mexico, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 31, 2017.  Fiscal 2016 other procurement (Army); research, development, testing and evaluation; operations and maintenance (Army); and other procurement, funds in the amount of $103,057,148 were obligated at the time of the award.  Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Release No: CR-007-16, Jan. 12, 2016
http://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/642757

Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $28,842,000 not-to-exceed, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-14-G-0020). This delivery order provides for air vehicle retrofit modifications associated with the F-35A fuel tankoverpressure engineering change proposal in support of the Air Force, and the governments of Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (62 percent); Ogden, Utah (28 percent); and Palmdale, California (10 percent), and is expected to be completed in March 2017. Fiscal 2014 and 2015 aircraft procurement (Air Force); 2016 research, development, test and evaluation (Air Force); and international partner funds in the amount of $14,421,000 will be obligated at time of award, $6,656,033 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases of the Air Force ($26,855,466; 93.11 percent); and the governments of Netherlands ($1,633,244; 5.67 percent); Italy ($201,880; 0.70 percent); Norway ($100,940; 0.35 percent) and Australia ($50,470; 0.17 percent). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Week 10 in 25 tweets

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Wat mij betreft sprong deze week het fulmineren van Eva Jinek (minuut 47) tegen het feit dat Nederland de NAVO-norm niet haalt er uit. CDA en VVD kiezen voor het verhogen naar het Europese gemiddelde van de BNP : militaire uitgaven (waardoor dit verder zal stijgen) en niet de NAVO-norm. Dat laatste kost de Nederlander € 6 miljard.

Niet alleen haalde Jinek de vlucht van haar vader in 1968 uit Praag en de dreigende Russische tanks aan - alsof '68 en '17 te vergelijken zijn - om haar woorden kracht bij te zetten, ze vergat ook te vragen ten koste van wat dit zou moeten gaan. Bij de AOW naar 65 jaar doet ze dat zeker niet.

Feminisme/8 maart

1 – 080317: "State security is often bought at the expense of the #insecurity of people at the margins of states." Book is on the #gender effects of it. Gender, War, & Conflict by Laura Sjoberg. (zie cover)

Nederland (zie ook 11, 20, 25)

2 – 070317: US Defense contracts with #Dutch participation '16 included the #crypto overhaul of Storage Security #WS3 in #Volkel http://broekstukken.blogspot.nl/2017/03/us-defense-contracts-with-dutch.html

3 – 090317: The CIA on Dutch based AVG http://bit.ly/2m64eGb For an overview of security programs (solved) vulnerabilties. http://bit.ly/2mEwnHs

EUROPA

Duitsland (zie 9, 17, 22, 24)

Frankrijk (zie ook 23)

4 – 070317: The #fairytale world of #French #arms export figures. How was 2016 for French arms exports? Depends on who you ask http://bit.ly/2mS1j8h

Turkije (zie ook 25)

5 – 090317: Even defence industry isn't a safe haven. #Turkey extends post-#coup probes, raids defense contractor #ASELSAN. http://bit.ly/2lH80d1

6 – 080317: Building walls isn't only a Trump malice. Trapped by war and a #Turkish wall, #Syrians dig in for long exile. http://bit.ly/2ni67jm

7 – 080317: #Turkey gets additional #drones of private firm Kale-Baykar to fight #ISIS and #Kurds http://bit.ly/2mmvUrv

Midden-Oosten (zie ook 6, 7)

8 110317: Some in the West do see their role in ravaged Arab lands. Some think more of the same is the solution. http://bit.ly/2mi7JZl

9 090317: Oh irony #Germany asks #peshmerga not to use its weapons ( #G36 ) against #PKK http://bit.ly/2m5Fhec

REST VAN DE WERELD

China

10 – 060317: #China says defense budget to rise by about 7 percent in 2017. That is to 1.3 % of projected #GNP. http://bit.ly/2mhAM2y

Israël (zie ook 19)

11 – 060317: Dutch TV on #Israeli #security industry and consultancy influence (in Europe). in English and Hebrew Dutch subtitles http://bit.ly/2n9WN0U(voor Engelstalig zie: https://youtu.be/eebf7Xpoims

Kenia

12 – 110317 3 Congressmen defend #Kenya-US #arms deal - Daily Nation http://bit.ly/2mRpF0M

Libanon

13 – 100317: #Lebanese Military Tribunal frees accused arms dealer. US claimed he was selling weapons when caught in US #DEA ops. http://bit.ly/2mAStsl

Noord-Korea

14 - 090317: The full Security Council report on North #Korean evasion techniques. No. of EU countries (also positive) mentioned. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3482392/NORTH-KOREA-REPORT.pdf

Saoedi-Arabië

15 – 110317: White House plans meeting with #Saudi prince amid terror threats just after giving green light for arms trade. https://t.co/mQ7MeiUy9Q

VS(zie ook 2, 3, 12, 13, 15,

16 – 060317: Hartung warns for what may come - another disastrous war - & shows it will be built on past policy, also of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Obama http://bit.ly/2mhH5Dd

DEFENSIE-INDUSTRIE

Rheinmetall (zie ook 24)

17 – 080317: #Rheinmetall to supply 25mm x 137 Frangible Armour Piercing (FAP) #ammunition for the #F35 stealth multirole fighter http://bit.ly/2nicOBS

WAPENS

Drones (zie ook 7)

18 - 090317: (Retweet @FrankSlijper) In first, missile test-launched from Israeli unmanned ship. New step in naval remote-control warfare. http://bit.ly/2nimk85

Onderzeeboten

19 – 110317: Saab targets submarine market http://bit.ly/2mZwgHh

Raketschild

20 – (Retweet thalesnederland) 100317: 1991 was het startschot voor de SMART-L radar. Huidige SMART-L EWC radars kunnen ballistische raketten vinden op 2000 kilometer afstand.http://bit.ly/2mhHKlQ

Satellieten

21 – 090317: The military nature of #satellite business asks for just a bit more cybersecurity http://bit.ly/2n9HNB2

Wapenbeurzen

22 – 110317: "Closed to public" UK arms fair sells surveillance gear and poison gas to torturers http://bit.ly/2mBf73N

Corruptie

23 – 060317: The French arms connection in South Africa. #corruption via @News24 http://bit.ly/2mS0Mmq

24 – 110317: Fresh evidence of graft found against #Rheinmetall, middleman allegedly hired to secure contracts. http://ecoti.in/731pBa  #corruption http://bit.ly/2mRoYVn

Onderzoek en activisme:

25 – 060317: Report: Dutch arms involved in unjustified Turkish operations. Nederlandse wapens onacceptabele ingzet door #Turkije http://bit.ly/2medhWv

Bijdrage aan raketschild leidt tot nieuwe nucleaire wapenwedloop

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Voor zover defensie in de verkiezingsstrijd aan de orde kwam ging  het er vooral over dat het  budget moest voldoen aan  de magische NAVO-norm van 2%. Een norm die geen enkele relatie heeft met behoefte of dreiging maar gekoppeld is aan het BNP. Het huidige budget gaat, met de aankoop van de F-35’s (Joint Strike Fighters) voor een belangrijk deel naar de Amerikaanse wapenindustrie. En nieuwe grote materieelprojecten staan op stapel, onder meer voor de Nederlandse deelname aan het raketschild, dat het precaire nucleair evenwicht verstoort. 

De sterk geïntegreerde Nederlandse en Belgische marines hebben onlangs besloten te streven naar aanschaf van identieke fregatten voor de bestrijding van onderzeeboten. België gaat er een miljard euro voor begroten, Nederland € 730 miljoen. Het financiële verschil kan veroorzaakt zijn doordat België anti-raket-raketten op de schepen wil plaatsen (zogenaamde 'shooter capaciteit') als onderdeel van het raketschild.
Het raketschild (missile shield) moet niet verward worden met Ronald Reagan's Star Wars of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) dat de wapenwedloop tijdens de Koude Oorlog opvoerde en bijdroeg aan de implosie van de Sovjet-Unie en een enorm begrotingstekort in de VS. Het huidige raketschild is een compleet ander project, dat mogelijk werd nadat de neoconservatieve regering van Bush jr. besloot zich terug te trekken uit het anti-ballistische raketten verdrag (ABM), en zijn pragmatische opvolger Obama de focus verlegde naar een raketschild dat bestond uit kleinere en meer diverse eenheden (ALTBMD).
Deze stappen van Amerikaanse presidenten werden nagevolgd door de NAVO-lidstaten . Hoewel de NAVO keer op keer bezwoer dat het raketschild niet tegen Rusland was gericht maar tegen Noord-Korea en Iran, voelt Moskou zich bedreigd door de verstoorde nucleaire balans. Het raketschild verkleint de mogelijkheden van de Russische ballistische raketten, het belangrijkste Russische wapens tegen een conventioneel veel sterkere NATO. En dat terwijl Rusland de NAVO-invloed steeds dichter bij zijn grens ziet komen.
Rusland reageerde onder meer door onderdelen van het raketschild in Europa te benoemen als doel voor een nucleaire aanval bij het uitbreken van een gewapend conflict. Dat gebeurde al in 2000 bij de opening van het radarstation in Vardo in Noorwegen en recentelijk, in 2015, vroeg de Russische ambassadeur in Denemarken zich openlijk af of Kopenhagen zich realiseerde dat raketschildtechnologie op marineschepen betekent dat Deense schepen doelwit kunnen worden voor Russische kernraketten.
Het raketschild kent onderdelen in de ruimte, op het land en op zee. De installaties op land, zoals in Polen en Roemenië, krijgen de meeste aandacht. Identieke wapens zijn gestationeerd op zee. Die zijn niet alleen mobieler, maar ook veel minder zichtbaar voor pers en publiek. De Amerikaanse website The National Interest schreef: "België heeft stilletjes beslist om nieuwe fregatten te voorzien van projectielen die buiten de atmosfeer raketten kunnen onderscheppen (interceptors). Een systeem dat verdacht veel lijkt op het Amerikaanse Aegis-systeem."
De raket
De onderscheppingsraket die België voor de nieuwe fregatten wil hebben, is de zogenaamde SM-3 raket van de Amerikaanse wapengigant Raytheon. SM-3 raketten zijn 6,5 meter lange stukken staal met een gewicht van 1,5 ton. Ze worden afgevuurd met de enorme snelheid van 16.000 km p/u. Het prijskaartje ligt tussen € 10 miljoen en € 24 miljoen per stuk. Onder het ABM-verdrag waren dergelijke raketten verboden. Inmiddels staan ze klaar voor gebruik in Polen en Roemenië, en ook op marineschepen, binnenkort ook op Belgische schepen. Ze zijn het belangrijkste onderdeel van een raketschild tegen ballistische raketten voor de middellange afstand (IRBM, met een bereik van 11.500 km tot 500 km).
In oktober 2016 analyseerden Russische militaire de mogelijkheden van de SM-3 raket en stelden vast dat deze de intercontinentale ballistische raketten (ICBM) van Russische onderzeeërs al tijdens de eerste fase van hun vlucht kunnen vernietigen. Volgens de Russische generaal Poznikhir leidt dit tot een "ernstige bedreiging van het nucleaire potentieel van Rusland en China” onder andere omdat raketten al geraakt kunnen worden voordat de verschillende kernkoppen splitsen en elk op een doel afgaan. Dat verzwakt de mogelijkheden van Russische en Chinese raketten aanzienlijk en betekent een vergroot nucleair overwicht voor de NATO. Door de Russen wordt dit als zeer bedreigend ervaren.
De raketten kunnen ook een rol spelen tegen satellieten in de onderste lagen van de ruimte, een domein dat steeds belangrijker wordt in oorlogvoering.
Cruciale rol voor radar
Voordat een raket koers kan zetten naar het doel moet dit eerst worden geïdentificeerd. Hier komt de bijdrage van de Nederlandse wapenindustrie aan het raketschild naar voren. Voor het vinden van het doel heb je een bijzonder goed radarsysteem nodig. Je kan kiezen voor het Amerikaanse Aegis systeem of voor de Smart-L Early Warning Capability (EWC) van Thales Nederland. Meer smaken zijn er niet. De Smart-L radar wordt momenteel geplaatst op de vier Nederlandse luchtverdedigingfregatten. Nederland zal daardoor in 2020 een sterke sensor hebben voor het vinden van ballistische raketten en daarmee een militair belangrijke rol in het raketschildproject vervullen. 'Ongeëvenaard' zegt Thales Nederland zelf over de radar. Het systeem wordt ook elders geprezen door militairen en techneuten en zelfs Zuid-Korea - gelegen in de Amerikaanse invloedssfeer - heeft Smart-L geïnstalleerd op een van haar schepen. Momenteel zijn er 26 verschillende varianten  van Smart-L actief (zie tabel).
Scheepsklasse
Land
Variant
Total units
 Nederlandse marine
Smart-L EWC
4
Sachsen fregat
 Duitse marine
Smart-L
3
Type 45 Daring destroyer
 Britse marine
S1850M
6
Queen Elizabeth vliegdekschip
 Britse marine
S1850M
2
Forbin FFG fregat
 Franse marine
S1850M
2
Andrea Doria DDG destroyer
 Italiaanse marine
S1850M
2
Dokdo LPH amfibisch landingsschip
Zuid-Koreaanse marine
Smart-L
4
 Deense marine
Smart-L
3
Air Operations Control Station Nieuw Milligen  commandocentrum
Nederlandse luchtmacht
Smart-L EWC (op land)
2
Totaal


26
België
België wil zijn nieuwe fregatten uitrusten met de raketten zelf (mits anderen zich aansluiten, anders wordt het te duur), scheef De Morgen in december 2016. Op pagina 149 van de Belgische Strategische Visie staat: "Onze fregatten zullen desgewenst ook kunnen ingeschakeld worden in een Ballistic Missile Defense-systeem aangezien ze zullen in staat zijn om missiles af te vuren die ballistische missiles kunnen engageren buiten de dampkring van de Aarde. Dit zal in samenwerking dienen te gebeuren met radarsystemen die in staat zijn tot langeafstandsdetectie aan boord van bijvoorbeeld luchtverdedigingsfregatten."
Dit maakt de combinatie van de Nederlandse luchtverdedigingsfregatten (het duurste wapenplatform dat  Nederland bezit, bij aankoop € 600 miljoen per schip met momenteel een modernisering t.w.v. € 100-250 miljoen) en de Belgische M-fregatten een volwaardige deelnemer aan het raketschild. De Nederlandse schepen kunnen doelen vinden, volgen en anti-raket raketten begeleiden, maar  niet zelf afvuren. Dat kunnen de Belgische schepen dan weer wel. De Nederlandse minister van Defensie verklaarde in januari 2017 dat de uitbreiding van de Nederlandse gevechtskracht door de invoering van een 'shooter' capaciteit voor Nederland nu niet aan de orde is, maar dat dit later nog kan komen.
Het gerenommeerde US Naval Institute publiceerde in februari 2017 een artikel waarin werd gesteld: "De vraag voor de regering Trump is of er moet worden doorgegaan met een volgende fase van het Europese raketschild of dat men moet pauzeren om een serieuze discussie met Rusland over nucleaire proliferatie en wapenbeheersing mogelijk te maken." Het weer op pakken  van wapenbeheersingsonderhandelingen lijkt best een goed idee. De verdere ontwikkeling van het raketschild dreigt te leiden tot een nieuwe nucleaire wapenwedloop.

Geschreven voor Grenzeloos
Engelstalige versie met bronnen
Redactie Wendela de Vries, Stop Wapenhandel 

Week 11 in 25 tweets

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Deze week vallen verschillende kwesties op. Twee tweets over Turks-Europese samenwerking (Duitsland en VK) en twee over opbouw (dreiging met) relaties Rusland. Ankara mist solidariteit en technologie overdracht vanuit NAVO. Het is echter onmiskenbaar dat de NAVO-technologie en defensie-industriële structuren veel meer met de Turkse defensie-industrie zijn verweven. Daar neem je niet zonder gevolgen afstand van.

Verder valt het grote aantal Zweedse (SAAB Gripen, corruptie) berichten op. Veel Zweeds nieuws haal het Engelse taalgebied niet. Deze berichten worden wel opgemerkt.
Figuur die laat zien hoe militaire uitgaven steeds groter deel van budget VS uitmaken.

Nederland (zie ook 18, 21)

1 – 150317: It is something annual, but I had never noticed it. NATO BENELUX Industry Day 17 March 2017 http://bit.ly/2mwB6bv

2 – 180317: Dutch conservatives & islamfobist #PVV voted against #rules to control small arms in European Parliament. (in Dutch) http://sargasso.nl/pvv-strengere-controle-op-wapenhandel/

EUROPA (zie 2, 9)
Duitsland (zie 4, 23)

Turkije (zie ook )

3 – 150317: #Turkish #Nurol exports armoured vehicles to North African country. Nurol partners #UK #BAE Systems. http://bit.ly/2nHNB3U

4 – 150317: Despite turmoil armoured vehicles venture between #Turkey’s BMC, #Germany’s Rheinmetall & Malaysia’s Etika continues http://bit.ly/2mRVYN2

5 – 170317: #Turkey considered #NATO before - but said it didn't see solidarity on technology sharing - #Russian #missile system http://bit.ly/2mXjE0V

6 – 170317: According to #Rosoboronexport #Turkey interested in Russian protection systems for tanks and small arms. http://bit.ly/2n3zE2O

VK(zie ook 3, 12

7 – 150317: Andrew Smith (#CAAT) on How #Brexit could fuel the international arms trade http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/03/how-brexit-could-fuel-international-arms-trade

Zweden (zie ook 11, 23)

8 – 140317: #Saab opens #Philippine office to market its #Gripen fighters. http://business.mb.com.ph/2017/03/12/saab-opens-philippine-office/via @manila_bulletin

Zwitserland

9 – 170317: #Swiss rifle association up in arms about #EU #gun law http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/referendum-threat_rifle-association-up-in-arms-about-eu-gun-law/43030494#.WMuhFpJ-fj4.twitter … @swissinfo_en

REST VAN DE WERELD

Brazilië

10 – 140317: #Swedish PM may be called to testify for #Brazil’s #Lula who is involved in #Saab #Gripen arms #corruption scandal http://bit.ly/2n2q7te

Colombia

11 – 180317: Dubious defense cooperation with #Colombia of #Sweden's #Saab. https://sputniknews.com/military/201703161051640319-sweden-colombia-saab/ @SputnikInt

India (zie ook 15)

12 – 140317: #Indian military Aerospace industry export opportunity: Sri Lanka’s fighter selection, it may be the #BAe #HAL #Hawk http://bit.ly/2mwOYSN

13 – 180317: #India's #steel companies are entering the #defence business supply chain. #Tatra #Essar remember #Krupp #Vickers http://bit.ly/2mhcXJU

Israël (zie ook 25)

14 – 150317: #Israeli executive, Yuval Marshak, pleads guilty to defrauding the US Foreign Military Financing #FMF program http://bit.ly/2n2pEaK

15 – 150317: #Israel’s arms sales to #India could imperil ties with #China http://bit.ly/2nuUiXR  via @asiatimesonline

Peru

16 – 180317: #Peru edges closer to clawing back $50m from Fujimori arms deals | #Corruption Metro Tell - South Africa News: http://www.metrotell.co.za/news/peru-edges-closer-to-clawing-back-50m-from-fujimori-arms-deals#.WM03lS-H258.twitter

Soedan

17 – 170317: South Sudan government to blame for famine, still buying arms: U.N. report http://reut.rs/2mFe41mvia @Reuters (Few days later denial by South-Sudanes government, see: http://bit.ly/2mJ0qe9 but report still secret.)

Vietnam

18 – 150317: #Vietnam, #Netherlands look to boost defence industry co-operation in environment full of tension. Wise? #Damen http://bit.ly/2mwB6bv

Jemen
19 – 130317: Kristine Beckerle'(#HRW): all "warring parties ... aren't doing enough to minimize harm to #civilians," in #Yemen. http://bit.ly/2nwI7cc

DEFENSIE-INDUSTRIE

Damen

20 – 160317: #Romanian government gives up on buying #Damen corvettes, because of illegal decision. http://actmedia.eu/daily/the-government-gives-up-on-buying-the-corvettes-which-had-to-be-built-in-galati/68509

Thales Nederland (zie ook 24)

21 – 180317: #Thales Netherlands is being awarded a $10 million contract for two Sea Sparrow #missile guidance units for #Japan. http://bit.ly/2mFoWfJ

WAPENS

F-35

22 – 140317: OyVey! F-35As can't hit moving targets, but fix is on its way. @ValerieInsinna reports http://bit.ly/2nHS9rc

Onderzeeboten

23 – 140317: Swedish Kongsberg German thyssenkrupp Marine Sys & Atlas Elektronik create joint venture on submarine combat systems https://kongsberg.com/en/kog/news/2017/march/enter%20into%20a%20comprehensive%20teaming%20agreement%20for%20submarines/

Raketschild

24 – 140317: Bijdrage aan raketschild leidt tot nieuwe nucleaire wapenwedloop https://www.grenzeloos.org/node/9179

Corruptie (zie ook Damen, 10, 11, 14, 16, 20)

25 – 150317: 13 held for #corruption at Israel weapons giant #Israeli #IAI. Allegations of bribes, theft, and money #laundering. http://bit.ly/2mM3UOb

Week 12 in 25 tweets

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Er zijn wat constanten in dit jaar. Twee daarvan:

De voortdurende leveringen aan Saoedi-Arabië, waarbij de tegenstanders vooral het conflict in Jemen aanvoeren. De Islamistische, autocratische en corrupte staat die de spil binnen het Soennitische machtsbolwerk is, kent meer redenen om niet te leveren. Oliedollars en juist die spilfunctie in een strategisch belangrijk gebied zorgen ervoor dat velen ethische overwegingen aan de kant schuiven en blijven leveren. In dit overzicht komt Fokkers bijdrage aan het Apache programma naar voren.

De andere constante is de problematische verhouding met Turkije. Het is een belangrijke afnemer van Europese wapentechnologie (zelfs geïntegreerd in het Europese defensie-industriële beleid), maar ook een dwarsligger in de Irak/Syrië oorlog, een land dat zich autocratisch, maar ook onvoorspelbaar ontwikkeld.

Bovendien een link naar het 18e Wapenexportrapport van de EU. 


Amerikaanse uitgaven voor de ruimteoorlog

Nederland (zie ook 17-21)

a – 260317: #Dutch MFA letter on #naval exports to #Thailand and #Indonesia. #Kamerbrief over afgifte vergunningen #wapenexport http://bit.ly/2n5bPEI

EUROPA

1 – 240317: Over 500 of pages on #EU member states arms exports. 18th annual report http://bit.ly/2nT9q4r

2 – 240317: Retweet @FrankSlijper, Scottish independence might hurt UK arms industry more than #Brexit http://bit.ly/2nT2cxi

3 – 240317: #EU Arms trade licenses 2015, total to: #Saudi's € 22,241,829,866 and Turkey € 2,600,449,052. Human Rights? Security? https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/13/56/EU_135627/index.shtml#I_135455

4 – 230317: Retweet @_ENAAT  #ENAAT and #vredesactie Op'Ed: EU defence policy ready for psychiatric treatment @EURACTIV http://bit.ly/2o6aKOv

België

– 260317: Belgian development aid minister De Croo calls for arms embargo on Saudi Arabia. The competence however is regional. http://bit.ly/2n6XGre

Duitsland (zie 6, 7)

Tsjechië

5 – 220317: #Czech president Zeman: "That (re-export of #arms) is none of our business." Adding that it is for the countries to deal with. CTK 21/3/17

Turkije (zie ook 3 )

6 – 220317: No arms for #Erdogan - #Bundesregierung refuses exports to #Türkei (in German) https://t.co/gGvIQS5v88

7 – 260317: #Ankara: #German guns in the hands of terrorists and restrictions on Turkish #weapons demands. This is unacceptable. http://bit.ly/2n6pkF0

VK(zie ook 2)

REST VAN DE WERELD

Australië(zie 14)

China

8 – 230317: #Taiwan #China relations, more arms & military expenditures not the solution, but seeking stable cross-strait ties http://bit.ly/2np8zap

9 – 220317: Export of #Chinese #drones assembly line to #Saudi Arabia 'will benefit both sides'http://www.ecns.cn/business/2017/03-22/250161.shtml

Egypte

10 – 240317: Retweet @FrankSlijper, Why Europe is floating Egypt's Navy - The promise and pitfalls of arms deals with Cairo https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-03-24/why-europe-floating-egypts-navy?cid=soc-tw-rdr@ForeignAffairs

Israël (zie ook 24)

11 – 230317: #Israeli skylark #drone downed over #Syria http://bit.ly/2n4WzaY

Jemen

12 – 240317: Retweet @DutchMFA, #KingdomNL, EU & Norway continue to support independent investigations into all alleged violations & abuses in Yemen. http://bit.ly/2mDMQNh

Koeweit

12 – 230317: A new US$ 37m load of #bombs for #Kuwait. http://bit.ly/2mDC0H3#federalregister

Nigeria

13 – 220317: How #Amnesty International effectively blocked #Nigeria from getting #COIN attack #aircraft. http://bit.ly/2npbno7

Saoedi-Arabië(zie ook b, 3, 9, 12, 21)

14 – 260317: Nations want to reimburse money spend on oil. #Australia selling military equipment to Saudi's an brutal autocracy. http://bit.ly/2n6ygKA

15 – 230317: #L3 Fuzing and Ordnance Systems got a $37m #FMS contract to provide #Saudi Arabia 38284 M734A1 & 165426 M783 #fuses. http://bit.ly/2nWwlw7

16 – 200317: #Boeing receives $3.2B US Army contract for Apache AH-64E sales to #Saudi Arabia's National Guard. #SANG http://bit.ly/2nBo13R

DEFENSIE-INDUSTRIE

Damen

17 – 240317: 8 + 4 #Damen Interceptors for #Panama built in #Turkey. Vessels used to counter #narcotic trade. http://bit.ly/2mDxad6

18 – 230317: #VSTEP (http://vstepsimulation.com/about/ ) and #Damen sign cooperation agreement for Royal #Bahamas Defence Force project http://www.en.portnews.ru/news/236233/

19 – 210317: Damen SEA 1180 Ofshore Patrol Vessel #OPV Roadshow tours Australia. http://bit.ly/2o5TCso

Thales Nederland

20 – 230317: Retweet Thales Nederland‏ @thalesnederland, Vandaag sprak Koning Willem-Alexander o.a. met Gerben Edelijn, CEO Thales & partner van HSD over uitdagingen in het veiligheidsdomein. http://bit.ly/2njDmUD

Fokker

21 – 210317: This weekend 42 Somali refugges killed by #Apache heli (after UAE denied it so investigation started). Dutch #Fokker http://bit.ly/2nT68hL

WAPENS

Apache (zie 16, 21)

Drones (zie ook 9, 11)

22 – 230317: The drone arms race: How the military is defeating #drones http://bit.ly/2np5tU8

F-35

24 – 200317: #F35 in bad weather again. After US (going #Boeing) now #Israel considers F15 for its fleet, instead of extra #JSF. http://bit.ly/2njJLPt

Wapenbeurzen

25 – 210317: LIMA Southeast Asia’s largest naval, aerospace arms fair in Malaysia. http://disq.us/t/2lgjkls  Companies per country: http://www.limaexhibition.com/exhibitors-list.php

Onderzoek en activisme (zie ook 4, 13)

Catch all in the Netherlands

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In November 2007 the Dutch government declared efforts to come to adoption of a European catch all policy was not needed, because “the idea of catch-all is already implemented in all EU member states participating in the Australia Group, the Missile Controle Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and in Regulation EC/1334/2000 to set-up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use each containing a catch-all measurement.”(1) The Catch-all order is based on Article 4 of this regulation.(2) It gives the government the possibility to control items not on the control lists if there are reasons to do so in circumstances as determined in article 4 of the Dual-use regulation. Since the imposition of a catch-all provision may lead to diminished legal certainty, the government uses its power to impose a mandatory license requirement with great prudence and caution. 

It's use is specified in the User Guide for Export Control on Strategic Goods and Services and this states the catch all can be imposed on goods that are not subject to mandatory licensing, but may be intended for: 

* the development of weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering such weapons;
* may be intended for goods on the EU list of military goods that have been exported to the country of end-use without the proper license required (see article 4, paragraph 3, of the Dual-use regulation);
* for any of the uses referred to above, the exporter is aware of, he must notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In such a case the exporter will be duly notified by MFA that a license is required on the export concerned; or
* if the purchasing country or country of destination is subject to an arms embargo of the EU, UN or OSCE and the items may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for a military end-use (see article 4, paragraph 2, of the Dual-use regulation).

In such cases the exporter will be informed by an individual decision. 

The catch all can also be used for reasons of public safety and human rights consideration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based on a Ministerial Regulation (Verordening, artikel 8 juncto Bsg, artikel 4), can issue a ban license requirement on the export of dual-use goods not appearing in Annex I of the Dual-use regulation (see article Article 8 of the Dual-use regulation).(3) 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will notify the exporter that a license is required on the concerned export. Violation of such a catch will be penalised according to the Wet Economische Delicten [Law on Economic Offences]. For the BES-island there is a specific Customs Law.(5) 

In the so-called carré-overleg, every two months among and policy departments, ongoing developments are discussed, like catch all cases. But it limits itself to the proliferation of WMD.(6) The Catch all also has the function to gain time to get better information and consider if the export is or is not in line with the above mentioned considerations more thoroughly.(7) 

Although the catch all can be used for and military end use in countries under an arms embargo in the Netherlands is mainly used for dual use. Article 4a of the Decision Strategic Goods provides the Minister with the powers to prohibit extra-community transit of dual use products and trans community transfer of dual use for WMD and military applications,(8) based on the EU Regulation provision given for this catch all policy.(9)

That the catch is mainly used on dual use is to be expected, because as Anna Werter explained the inclusion of it in the control regimes on regimes controling WMD-weapons and the Missile Regime were necessary in order to keep export controls up to date with rapid technological developments and with new intelligence about possible military applications.(10) Dennis Krepp of the National Security and Technology Transfer Controls of the U.S. Department of Commerce statedd in 2012 that the catch-all clauses mainly exist to to be able to control exports that contribute to programs of concern.(11) Also for the Dutch government catch-all is focussed on dual-use. The Dutch government recently tried to expand the catch all in the frame work of EC/428/2009 to ICT related technology which can be used for human rights violations and has encouraged this in 2014 in the EU fora.(12)

The Catch all reported
 
The use of the catch-all is the most under-reported aspects of arms trade policy. When searching the official Dutch website rechtspraak.nl [justice.nl] on catch-all several cases verdicts and hearings are mentioned. But they have no connection with weapon/military related exports or point to the same case, the exports by Slebos Research to Pakistan in connection with the nuclear programs of his study friend Abdul Qadeer Khan.(13) In the end Slebos was in fact not punished. He got a suspended fine of € 85.000, but with a probation of only one day only to show the proven crime is worthy of condemnation and for preventive reasons.(14) After more as four years the complicated catch-all and dual use case came to an sloppy end. In the annual reports on military exports, the Netherlands mentioned catch all denials only in 2009: civil aircraft parts and civil camouflage paint to Iran.(15) But since that time the term catch all is mentioned only once in the 2014 report in connection to improved catch all use in the framework of the Australia group.(16) The catch all was also part of the annual report of the General (AIVD) and Military (MIVD) Intelligence and Secret Service reporting, they provided information to the Ministry of Economics, Agriculture and Inovation (now Ministry of Economics) leading to several cases of enforcing catch all cases.(17)

The Catch alls are not exchanged among the member states, however one third of the denials are connected to catch alls according a 2009 evaluation report of Dutch arms export policy.(18) In the same year however the Minister of Economics Van Ardenne wrote to the parliament that European exchange on catch all cases is not an established policy, but that exchange of information on exports to Iran are more extensively shared and evaluated among EU Member States.(19) Most detailed Dutch information is a table provided in December 2008 on catch alls to countries under embargo or are potentially dangerous proliferation destinations.(20)

Datum
Product
Land van
bestemming
Vergunning aangevraagd
Vergunning verleend
Opmerkingen
10/09/2008
Wetenschappelijke tijdschriften
Iran
Ja, 20 stuks
Ja, 11 stuks

19/08/2008
Röntgen diffractie apparatuur (onderdelen voor)
Iran
Nee


29/07/2008
Rotorbladen
Iran
Nee


12/06/2008
Aluminium buizen
Iran en Irak
Nee


21/05/2008
Ringen
Iran


Ingetrokken
25/04/2008
Werktuigmachines (onderdelen voor)
Iran
Nee


01/04/2008
Uranium analyse apparatuur
Iran
Nee


28/03/2008
Smeermiddel
Iran
Ja
Ja

27/03/2008
Onderhoudsapparatuur
Iran
Ja
Nee

25/03/2008
Vliegtuigonderdelen
Iran
Nee


26/02/2008
Vliegtuigonderdelen
Iran
Nee


13/02/2008
Filters voor microdeeltjes (HEPA)
Iran
Ja
Ja

29/01/2008
Duikapparatuur en toebehoren
Iran
Ja
Nee

16/01/2008
Gaschromatrograaf
Iran
Ja
Nee

02/01/2008
Nikkellegeringen
Iran
Nee


30/11/2007
Staal gelegeerd met chroom en molybdeen
Iran
Nee


30/11/2007
Reinigingsmiddel
Iran
Nee


29/08/2007
Roestvrijstalen staven
Iran
Nee


28/08/2007
Software
Iran
Nee


30/08/2007
Warmte-behandelingsoven
Iran
Nee


20/08/2007
Plasmaspuitapparatuur
Iran
Ja
Nee

02/08/2007
Fotospectrometer
Iran
Nee


29/01/2007
Vliegtuigonderdelen
Iran
Ja, 216 stuks
Ja, 152 stuks
Herzien
13/11/2006
Grondverf
Iran
Nee


05/10/2006
Vliegtuigonderdelen
Iran


Ingetrokken
28/09/2006
Vliegtuigonderdelen
Iran


Ingetrokken
Source: Vaste commissie voor Economische Zaken, List of questions and answers. Published December 5, 2008-2009, 22054, no. 143, Tweede Kamer 2008-2009, question 2.

Recent cases 

One of the more recent cases deals with the deliverance in 2003 of glycol (MEG) from the Netherlands to Syria. The Netherlands was warned by the US during a conversation with employees of the Ministries of Foreign and Economic Affairs at the 7th of August 2003 that the MEG was intended for the Syrian missile program. Belgium customs stopped the glycol in the harbour of Antwerp and the Netherlands was asked by the US to assist in preventing the export to sail. However this was juridically impossible, because a treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium of 1842 prohibited limitations on consignments from Antwerp via De Schelde to the North Sea. The Belgium authorities were also juridically hampered because the goods where not on the dual-use list and because it was a Dutch export they were not authorised to stop it by a catch all. This hole was relatively fast repaired having glycol on a Dutch National dual use Regulation.(21) A relatively fast solution to prevent further exports.

In 2015 German de-militarised army trucks were exported to Sudan (see also below). Members of Parliament Raymond Knops (CDA) and Sjoerd Sjoerdsma both asked questions on the issue. Knops asked if agreements with industry and trade on a small number of sensitive destinations (like Syria, North-Korea, Sudan, Myanmar and Iran) to prevent the export of potentially sensitive, non-strategic goods, military used at its destination. He asked if in this kind of agreement, without large administrative burdens, the catch-all could be used. The answer on use of the catch-all was given to Sjoerdsma: “a catch all can only be enforced if the (civil) goods which are not listed on the EU military list, but get an military use in a country under an arms embargo. Military end use is only the case when the (civil) goods are used for the development, production or overhaul of goods on the EU military list,” according to Minister Ploumen of Trade and Development Aid answered. In this case the Netherlands considers the trucks as civil and thus not under the catch all.(22)

(unpublished May 2016) 
Footnotes:
  1. Van Velzen, K, Questions to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice and secretary of Economic Affairs on the deliverance of strategic goods to Pakistan of October 9, 2007. Published October 9, 2007, 2007-2008. Answered by Minister of Foreign Affairs Verhagen, M.J.M. and the Secretary of Economics Heemskerk, F., also on behalve of the Minister of Justice. Received November 7, 2007. Published March 17, 2008. 2007-2008, question 1601.
  2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Handboek Strategische Goederen en Diensten, April 2016, p. 16.
  3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Handboek Strategische Goederen en Diensten, April 2016, p. 16; and Handboek Veiligheid, Gezondheid, Economie en Milieu (VGEM [Security, Health, Economy and Environment]); chapter 5 on Dual-use goods on the web site of the tax authorities (http://www.belastingdienst.nl/bibliotheek/handboeken/html/boeken/HVGEM/strategische_goederen-goederen_voor_tweeerlei_gebruik_dual_use_.html)
  4. Van Velzen, K, Questions to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice and secretary of Economic Affairs on the deliverance of strategic goods to Pakistan of October 9, 2007. Published October 9, 2007, 2007-2008. Answered by Minister of Foreign Affairs Verhagen, M.J.M. and the Secretary of Economics Heemskerk, F., also on behalve of the Minister of Justice. Received November 7, 2007. Published March 17, 2008. 2007-2008, question 1601.
  5. Besluit van 23 december 2010 tot vaststelling van het Uitvoeringsbesluit Douane- en Accijnswet BES (Uitvoeringsbesluit Douane- en Accijnswet BES) Article 2.3. This article regulates the licensing for export. Is connected to agreements in which the Netherlands is a party. The regulation is similar to the Dutch export regulation. Also the BES islands may use a so-called catch-all for reasons of public security or on human rights considerations.
  6. This so-called carréoverleg is mentioned in Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en report Beleidsevaluatie, Beleidsdoorlichting van het Nederlandse exportcontrole- en wapenexportbeleid, IOB Evaluaties, no. 325, October 2009. Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 52; and Doorvoer van strategische goederen; Het wettelijk kader en de bestuurlijke praktijk in het Vlaamse Gewest en de naburige stelsels Kathleen Van Heuverswyn, i.s.m. Nils Duquet, Brussel, 6 augustus 2013 ( http://www.vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/rapport_doorvoer_van_strategische_goederen.pdf
  7. Handboek Veiligheid, Gezondheid, Economie en Milieu (VGEM [Security, Health, Economy and Environment]); chapter 5.4.3 Catch-all regulation on exports on the web site of the tax authorities (http://www.belastingdienst.nl/bibliotheek/handboeken/html/boeken/HVGEM/strategische_goederen-goederen_voor_tweeerlei_gebruik_dual_use_.html)
  8. See: Article 4a Besluit strategische goederen (valid April 1, 2015 until present).
  9. Article 4(6) COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 428/2009 of 5  May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.
  10. Anna Werter, Enforcing European Union Law enforcing on exports of dual-use goods, SIPRI Research Report no. 24, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 57.
  11. Mr. Dennis Krepp Office of National Security and Technology Transfer Controls U.S. Department of Commerce, Powerpoint: Implementing Catch All Controls A Risk Assessment-based Approach Toward Nonproliferation, March 2012 (http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/documents/organization/190331.pdf, visited May 3, 2016)
  12. Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. List of questions and answers of February 11, 2016, 2015-2016, published February 12, no. 270, 22 054, question 42. Staatssecretaris Bleker van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie during Parliamentary debate stated the same on January 2012, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2011–2012, 22 054, nr. 190 , p. 15 kst-22054-190.
  13. See http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/ e.g. this one http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBALK:2005:AU8250 and search for “catch-all.” For an overview of the operations by Slebos see, Frank Slijper, Project Butter Factory; Henk Slebos and the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, Transnational Institute in association with Campagne tegen Wapenhandel, Amsterdam, September 2007.
  14. http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BH1775
  15. Iran was a priority at the time, see 21501-02-961 Minister of Economic Affairs Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, Raad Algemene Zaken en Raad Buitenlandse Zaken, Den Haag, 21 april 2010 Tweede Kamer 2009-2010.
  16. Wapenexportbeleidsraporten 2004-214 searched for catch all, only two catches. Annual Report Arms Export Policy 2014 (in Dutch), p. 14.
  17. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Annual report 2010 of Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, april 2011, p. 30. blg-109155; and Ministry of Defence Annual Report Arms Export Policy 2010 Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (Annual report) MIVD 2010 April 2011, p. 41.blg-111454.
  18. Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en report Beleidsevaluatie, Beleidsdoorlichting van het Nederlandse exportcontrole- en wapenexportbeleid, IOB Evaluaties, no. 325, October 2009. Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 82.
  19. Minister of Economic Affairs Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, M.J.A., Letter Council General and Foreign Affairs, April 21, 2010. Published April 23, 2010, 2009-2010, 21501-02 no. 961.
  20. Vaste commissie voor Economische Zaken, List of questions and answers. Published December 5, 2008-2009, 22054, no. 143, Tweede Kamer 2008-2009, question 2.
  21. Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de vaste commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken, debate on Initiatiefnota van de leden Sjoerdsma en Servaes: «Wapens en Principes, Ambities voor een geloofwaardig en geharmoniseerd wapenexportbeleid in Europa». Published on 16 september 2015, 2015-2016, 34103 no. 6; and The algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, List of questions and answers. Published June 20, 2014, 2013-2014, 22054, No. 246.
  22. Sjoerdsma, S., Question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Aid on trucks to Sudan, sent June 26 2015 and answered by Minister Ploumen September 2, 2015 2014-2015 (3296); Knops, R., additional questions on same issue to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Aid, sent July 1, 2015 and answered by Minister Ploumen September 2 2015 2014-2015 (3295).

Week 13 in 25 tweets

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0
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De uitspraken van de Belgische minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking De Croo over het stoppen van wapenleveranties aan Saudi-Arabië levert een stroom berichten op. Aan de orde komt de positie van Wallonië (in België is de verantwoordelijkheid over wapenhandel aan de regio's gedelegeerd). Het Vlaams Vredesinstituut zet een methode uiteen waarbij Vlaanderen en Wallonië gezamenlijk kunnen optreden. Maar ook Vlaamse handen zijn niet schoon, zo noemen schrijvers het leveren van Vlaamse technologie die geassembleerd wordt in wapens die uiteindelijk in Jemen terecht komen. Iets waarmee we ook in Nederland te maken hebben. (Zie Broekstukken, http://bit.ly/2ntnrl4en Fokker bericht week 12).

Op het gebied van informatie: Het Europees Netwerk Tegen Wapenhandel (ENAAT) verwerkte de onlangs gepubliceerde gegevens uit het 18 EU wapenexportrapport in de zoekmachine. Zodat de enorme bulk aan informtie ook bruikbaar is.
In de Verenigde Staten werd een ander belangrijk rapport gepubliceerd, het zogenaamde World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfers (WMEAT) rapport.
In Brussel sprak Paul Holden, schrijver van Indefensible; seven myths that sustain the global arms Trade, op een bijeenkomst georganiseerd door het Vlaamse Vredesactie. Het is een goed leesbaar boek, vol aangrijpingspunten om de wapenindustrie te begrijpen en analyseren. Hieronder een stuk uit The Guardian erover.

Nederland (zie ook 20)

1 – 260317: #Dutch MFA letter on #naval exports to #Thailand and #Indonesia. #Kamerbrief over afgifte vergunningen #wapenexport http://bit.ly/2ntgIHY

2 – 300317: Flemish technology for military aircraft used during conflict in #Yemen is an issue, a similar #Dutch case isn't. #Fokker Apache-components. (zie week 12)

3 – 300317: Hulp en wapenhandel: dubbele moraal Nederlandse regering bij oorlog Jemen: zometeen vanaf 18:15 op NPO 1: http://bit.ly/2n0SglD

4 – 300317: Retweet @max_valstar Much attention in NL parliament yesterday evening, for debate with @DutchMFA Koenders about EU arms exports to Yemen conflict.

5 – 010417: Court case. #Bulgarian list showed suspects imported alarmpistols (upgrading, importing ammo). Partly acquitted. http://bit.ly/2n0QNf7

EUROPA

6 – 280317: Europese Investeringsbank voor wapenindustrie? #ENAAT #Stopwapenhandel http://bit.ly/2oph32K

7 – 290317: Protest in front of the European Defence Agency (#EDA). @Vredesactie http://bit.ly/2nt1QcA

8 – 290317: "the EU’s new, slightly-anxious embrace of shared defence research risks alienating many scientists" (via @scibus) http://bit.ly/2owAZ11

België (zie ook 7)

9 – 260317: Belgian development aid minister De Croo calls for arms embargo on Saudi Arabia. The competence however is regional. http://bit.ly/2nwf3SG

10 – 290317: 'What is taken for granted in other countries, isn't in #Belgium.''Flemish #hightech in planes #Saudi's use.'http://bit.ly/2opbNfy

Duitsland (zie 12)

Griekenland

11 – 010417: Thirteen indicted for defence contracts signed when Papantoniou was minister http://bit.ly/2nKIQYB  via @theGRobsv

Turkije (zie ook )

12 – 260317: #Ankara: #German guns in the hands of terrorists and restrictions on Turkish #weapons demands. This is unacceptable. http://bit.ly/2nwjpJm

VK(zie ook )

13 – 290317: Overview of #UK arms trade policies and the opposition against it. http://bit.ly/2nNwO2pvia @globalvoices

Rusland

14 – 290317: #Chemezov's (close to President Vladimir Putin) #Rostec eyes #India, #Indonesia to become a major arms producer. http://bit.ly/2nZ6Zg9

REST VAN DE WERELD

China (zie 16)
India (zie ook 14)
Indonesië(zie 1, 14)
Jemen (zie 2-4, Saudi-Arabië)

Kenia

15 – 010417: 'Secretive' unit behind #Kenya’s arms deal, says US congressman Ted #Budd - Kenyan Daily Nation http://bit.ly/2nsYc2j #L3 #AT-802L

Saoedi-Arabië (zie ook 2-4, 9, 10, 22)

16 – 260317: #China supports #Saudi Arabia's economic ambitions with battle tested #drones sales http://search.ecns.cn/search.do?q=drones%20saudi

17 – 290317: “Saudis got themselves into a mess that they couldn’t win.” Pentagon wants more support for Saudi’s war in Yemen http://read.bi/2owPWjJ

Taiwan

18 – 260317: Tapei drooling in front of to expensive F35B. http://bit.ly/2opqAaw

Thailand (zie 1)

Zuid-Afrika

19 – 280317: #Denel wants #Courts to approve venture with Gupta-Linked VR Laser but doubts cast over Denel Asia's legal standing. http://huff.to/2nKCfO3

DEFENSIE-INDUSTRIE

Damen

20 – 300317: Damen Shipyards neemt opnieuw afscheid van handelsagent (update) | #corruption Quote http://bit.ly/2owBFDD

WAPENS

Drones (zie 16)
F-35 (zie 18)
Kleine wapens (zie 5)

Raketschild

21 – 300317 – Missile defence development continues. US Navy, MDA experimenting with #laser for surface warfare and #BMD http://bit.ly/2nNGMRq

Corruptie (zie 11, 15, 19, 20)

Onderzoek en activisme (zie ook 8):

22 – 310317: Action on #Yemen & London visiting #Saudi general, see short clip. "This is the guy in charge of the war crimes."http://ind.pn/2oN1vT3

23 – 280317: Retweet @SecurityRethink  Mar 27 Important piece on #security, "threat inflation"& the roles of arms companies in fuelling conflict http://bit.ly/2nwfaxG#RethinkSecurity

24 – 300417: Retweet @rachelstohl 
More
ICYMI: 2016 World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfers report is out http://bit.ly/2nNJ9ng Intl arms deliveries rose ~74% in 10yr period

25 – 270417: The #EU 1-18th arms trade report is made useful by #ENAAT-tool. Search on supplier, destination, value, year etc. http://bit.ly/2opq4cw

Tweede Kamerstukken over wapenexportbeleid (22054)

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0
0
Nr.
Omschrijving
Publicatie datum
link
284
>2m brief Thailand en Indonesië
27 maart 2017
2017
: ( moties), brieven, AO's en Lijst vragen en antwoorden.
283
Brief ministers BuZa & OS over Jemen en Tsjechië
Bijlage: Lijst met sinds 2004 uitgevoerde goederen naar Saoedi-Arabië, Jemen, VAE, Qatar, Jordanië en Egypte
2 december 2016

282
>2m brief Jamaica
16 november 2016
281
Motie De Roon geen wapens naar OIC-landen
10 november 2016
280
Verslag van een AO
10 november 2016
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-22054-280.html
279
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
7 november 2016
278
Correctie jaarrapport
11 oktober 2016
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-785270.pdf
277
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2015
13 juli 2016
276
Brief regering met toezeggingen AO
27 juni 2016
275
>2m 2e hands Jordanië
24 mei 2016
274
Verslag van een AO
31 maart 2016
273
Motie Servaes strikte toepassing wapenexportbeleid
9 maart 2016
272
Motie Van Dijk over diensthonden Israëlische leger
9 maart 2016
271
Motie Van Dijk/Sjoerdsma embargo Saoedi Arabië
9 maart 2016
270
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
12 februari 2016
269
Toezeggingen Minister Ploumen
10 februari 2016
268
Brief Ploumen exportcontrole honden
10 februari 2016
267
Brief Ministers Ploumen en Koenders, toezeggingen
26 januari 2016
2016
17: 4 moties, 7 brieven, 2 >2mbrieven, 2 AO's en 2 Lijsten vragen en antwoorden.
266
Brief Ploumen over brief Amnesty verzekeraars investeren in Clusterwapens
4 december 2015
265
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2014
23 november 2015
264
>2m brief Oman
2 september 2015
263
>2m Egypte via Frankrijk
2 september 2015
262
>2m 2e hands Jordanië
26 augustus 2015
261
>2m 2e hands Peru
30 juni 2015
260
>2m 2e hands Jordanië
10 maart 2015
259
Verslag van een AO
16 februari 2015
2015
8: 1 brieven, 1 AO, 5 >2mbrieven, 1 rapportage
258
Motie van Dijk leveringen Oekraïne
22 december 2014
257
Motie Van Dijk maandoverzichten
22 december 2014
256
>2m VAE
15 december 2014
255
>2m 2e hands Peru
13 november 2014
254
>2m 2e hands Jordanië
13 november 2014
253
>2m 2e hands Peru
5 november 2014
252
>2m Trinidad & Tobago
22 oktober 2014
251
Verslag van een AO Glycol Syrië
18 augustus 2014
250
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2013
11 augustus 2014
249
Aanpassing Dual-use verordening
29 juli 2014
248
Brief Minister Timmermans ATT goedkeuring
1 juli 2014
247
Brief Minister Ploumen Australië Groep
20 juni 2014
246
Export Corrosiepompen blg
Glycol blg
Chemicaliën Syrië blg
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
20 juni 2014
245
Brief Minister Ploumen leveringen Syrië
29 april 2014
244
>2m Maleisië
18 april 2014
243
>2m Turkmenistan
24 maart 2014
242
Verslag van een AO
19 maart 2014
241
>2m Tanzania
18 maart 2014
240
Brief over alle in 2012 verstrekte dualuse vergunningen
25 februari 2014
239
>2m 2e hands Jordanië
7 februari 2014
2014
2 moties, 5 brieven, 2 AO, 9 >2mbrieven, 2 rapportages
238
Brief Ploumen verzoek openbaar maken brief Syrische chemische wapens
24 december 2013
237
Rapportage Nederlandse bedrijven bij Syrische chemische wapens
16 december 2013
236
>2m 2e hands Gill Finland
12 december 2013
235
Brief Minister Timmermans ATT
3 december 2013
234
>2m Levering Indonesië via Zuid-Korea
29 november 2013
233
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2012
15 november 2013
232
>2m 2e hands Jordanië
1 oktober 2013
231
>2m Levering Algerije via China
15 augustus 2013
230
Verslag van een AO
9 augustus 2013
229
>2m aanvullende info Taiwan
6 augustus 2013
228
>2m Taiwan
1 augustus 2013
227
>2m Singapore
23 juli 2013
226
Motie Leegte en Mulder over gelijhk speelveld
8 juli 2013
225
Motie van Dijk en Van Ojik opschoten onderhandelingen leverantie Jordanië
8 juli 2013
224
Brief Minister Ploumen Glycol / Syrië
26 juni 2013
223
>2m levering Indonesië
18 juni 2013
222
Brief Minister Ploumen Glycol / Syrië
6 juni 2013
221
>2m Levering Algerije via VK
22 mei 2013
220
Brief Slotconferentie ATT
17 mei 2013
219
>2m Oman
25 april 2013
218
Brief 2e Hands Jordanië
16 april 2013
217
Brief Ministers Ploumen en Timmermans afstoting overtollig defensie materieel
15 april 2013
216
Verslag van een AO
5 april 2013
215
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden Tanks naar Indonesië
15 maart 2013
214
>2m Egypte
13 maart 2013
213
>2m Oman
26 februari 2013
212
Brief Deelname slotconferentie ATT
22 februari 2013

211
Brief Minister Timmermans inzet ATT
20 februari 2013
210
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
25 februari 2013
209
Rapportage 1e helft 2012
18 febuari 2013
208
>2m 2e Hands Jordanië
13 februari 2013
207
Brief Minister van Dfensie, Hennis, Verkoop leopards Kraus Mafei Wegeman (Indonesië)
11 januari 2013
2013
33: 2 moties, 11 brieven, 2 AO, 2 lijst vragen en antwoorden, 13 >2mbrieven, 3 rapportages
206
Brief Worldwide investment in cluster munitions
11 december 2012
205
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2011
1 november 2012
204
Brief Hervatten leveringen aan Egypte
17 oktober 2012
203
Verslag van een AO
8 augustus 2012
202
Brief Minister Rosenthal onderhandelingen ATT
2 augustus 2012
201
Brief Ministers Rosenthal en Hillen over verkoop tanks aan Indonesië
30 juli 2012
200
Verslag van een AO over verkoop tanks aan Indonesië.
25 juli 2012
199
Brief Minister Rosenthal en stssec Bleker over wapenleveranties Egypte
12 juli 2012
198
Motie Timmermans en El Fassed over uniforme uitleg EU regels
11 juli 2012
197
Motie Peters en El Fassed overzicht dual-use leveringen
11 juli 2012
196
Motie Peters en El Fassed over internetfiltertechnologie
11 juli 2012
195
Brief Minister Rosenthal over ATT onderhandelingen
18 juni 2012
194
Brief Ministers Hillen en Rosenthal verkoop tanks aan Indonesië
9 mei 2012
193
Brief stssec Bleker SIPRI factsheets wapenhandel
18 april 2012
192
>2m naar Thailand
17 april 2012
191
Brief Ministers Rosenthal en Hillen bezoek Indonesiërs tanks voor Indonesië
14 maart 2012
190
Verslag van een AO
1 februari 2012
2012
17: 3 Moties, 9 brieven, 3 AO, 1 >2mbrieven, 1 rapportages
189
Brief aanbieding rapport MENA
28 december 2011
188
Brief Rosenthal CCW conferentie
29 december 2011
187
Motie van Vliet geen wapens naar OIC
23 december 2011
186
Motie Voordewind Nee tenzij voor Midden-Oosten
23 december 2011
185
Motie El Fassed en Voordewind over richtlijnen toetsing
23 december 2011
184
Motie Voordewind geen leveranties aan Egypte
23 december 2011
183
Motie El Fassed over ATT
23 december 2011
182
Motie Fassed over ad-hoc vergunningsplicht intemetfiltertechnologie
23 december 2011
181
Motie Fassed drempelwaarde >2m
23 december 2011
180
Rapportage 1e heflt 2011
16 december 2011
179
Brief Rosenthal en Bleker reactie moties Van Dijk 173 en El Fassed 172
13 december 2011
178
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2010
30 september 2011
177
Verslag schriftelijk overleg inzake wapenexportbeleid
11 juli 2011
176
Motie Verhoeven/El Fassed over niet-verbodscriteria
4 juli 2011
175
Motie Van Dijk over toetsing criteria
4 juli 2011
174
Motie Van Dijk moratorium wapenexport Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika
4 juli 2011
173
Motie Van Dijk landen waar mensenrechtenscheningen plaats vinden
4 juli 2011
172
Motie El Fassed wapenexport Saoedi Arabië
4 juli 2011
171
Motie El Fassed verleende vergunnign wapenexportMotie Van Dijk
4 juli 2011
170
Motie El Fassed alg. Vergunning doorvoer
4 juli 2011
169
Motie El Fassed export- en doorvoervergunningen
4 juli 2011
168
Motie El Fassed dremplewaarde >1m
4 juli 2011
167
Motie El Fassed rapporteren vergunningen
4 juli 2011
166
Brief stssec Bleker IKV-brief clustermunitie
21 juni 2011
165
Brief Bleker en Rosenthal aanpassingen wapenexportbeleid
21 juni 2011
164
Verslag van een AO
20 april 2011
2011
27: 17 moties, 5 brieven, 2 AO, 2 rapportages, 1 schriftelijk overleg
163
Rapportage 1e heflt 2010
17 november 2010
162
Motie El Fassed over het afdwingen van garanties
23 september 2010
161
Motie Van Dijk over afdwingen geen investeringen in clustermunitie
23 september 2010
160
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
11 augustus 2010
159
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2009
24 juni 2010
158
Brief reactie De Jager en Donner motie 155 clustermunitie Van Velzen en Van Dam
7 april 2010
157
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
30 januari 2010
155
Motie Van Velzen Van Dam investeringen clustermunitie
29 januari 2010
2010
8: 3 moties, 1 brieven, 2 rapportages, 2 lijst van vragen en antwoorden
156
Motie van Velzen en Van Dam drempelwaarde >1m
22 december 2009
154
Verslag van een AO
26 november 2009
153
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e heflt 2009 (overzicht zelf onvindbaar)
19 november 2009
152
Motie Van Velzen om voornemens tot wapenexport ter inzage te leggen voor Tweede Kamer
3 november 2009
151
Motie Van Velzen en Peters geen dual-use chemicaliën voor Israël
3 november 2009
150
Motie Van Velzen investeringen clustermunitie
3 november 2009
149
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2008
13 oktober 2009
148
Brief Heemskerk uitstel rapport wapenexportbeleid 2008
9 juli 2009
147
Brief Jack de Vries verkoop Leopards aan Duitsland
22 mei 2009
146
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
18 mei 2009

145
Brief van Heemskerk actualisering wapenexportcijfers
26 maart 2009
144
Brief Minister Verhagen invoering 2008/944/CFSP

17 februari 2009

2009
12: 4 moties, 4 brieven, 1 AO, 2 rapportages, 1 Lijst vragen en antwoorden
143
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
5 december 2008
142
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e heflt 2008 (overzicht zelf onvindbaar)
5 december 2008
141
Brief Minister Verhagen over verruiming verkoop overtollige defensievoertuigen
3 oktober 2008
140
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2007
16 september 2008
139
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
16 mei 2008
138
Brief Van Heemskerk doorvoer 7 lidstaten
18 februari 2008
137
Motie Van Velzen Van Dam ad-hoc vergunningplicht
15 februari 2008
136
Verslag van een AO
1 februari 2008
135
Motie Van Velzen Van Dam over actueel houden maandrapportages
30 januari 2008
134
Motie Van Velzen Van Dam ad-hoc vergunningplicht
30 januari 2008
2008
10: 3 moties, 2 brieven, 1 AO, 2 rapportages, 2 lijst vragen en antwoorden
133
Lijst van Vragen en Antoorden
Study on the effects of a EU defence industry and market
Overzicht deelname EDA projecten
17 december 2007
13 december 2007

13 december 2007

132
Brief verkoop Leopards aan Portugal
13 november 2007
131
Brief Heemskerk beantwoording vragen
12 november 2007
130
Brief verkoop HAWK PIP II luchtverdedigingssyteem aan Israël
29 oktober 2007
129
Brief stssec Van der Knaap over YPR-voertuigen en enig ander materieel aan Chili
18 oktober 2007
128
Brief stssec Van der Knaap over Leopard tanks aan Canada
18 oktober 2007
127
Brief verkoop HAWK PIP II luchtverdedigingssyteem aan Israël
18 oktober 2007
126
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2006
18 september 2007
125
Verslag van een AO
7 september 2007
124
Brief stssec Heemskerk over informeren rond afstoting overtollig materieel
27 augustus 2007
123
Motie Van Dam rond eindbestemmingsverklaring componenten
23 juli 2007
122
Motie Van Dam rond vergunningsplicht alle doorvoer
11 juli 2007
121
Motie Van Dam, Vendrik, Van Velzen
rond eindbestemmingsverklaring componenten
11 juli 2007
120
Motie Van Velzen herstellen waarschuwen Kamer bij leveranties overtollig materieel
11 juli 2007
119
Motie van Velzen geen leveringen aan kazachstan
11 juli 2007
118
Motie van Velzen verbod doorvoer clusterwapens
11 juli 2007
117
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden Compensatiebeleid
13 april 2007
2007
16: 6 moties, 7 brieven, 1 AO, 1 rapportages, 2 lijst vragen en antwoorden
116
Vertrouwelijke brief wapenexportbeleid ter inzage
22 december 2006
115
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 2006
21 december 2006
114
Verslag AO korvetten naar Indonesië
27 november 2006
113
Brief Ministers Bot en Van Ardenne over samenwerking SALW in Afrika
27 oktober 2006
112
Brief Ministers Bot en Van Ardenne over SALW programma VN
14 september 2006
111
Brief stssec Van Gennip over arms brokering
14 juli 2006
110
AO over herzieningsprogramma VN SAWL
10 juli 2006
109
Brief over over herzieningsprogramma VN SAWL
6 juli 2006
108
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2005
3 juli 2006
107
Brief Miniser Bot over herzieningsprogramma VN SAWL
12 mei 2006
106
Brief Van Gennip over exportkredieten
10 mei 2006
105
Verslag van een AO
18 april 2006
104
Motie Blom vergunning bij levering componenten
12 april 2006
103
Motie Blom vergunning bij doorvoer
12 april 2006
102
Motie Blom komen tot wapenhandelverdrag
12 april 2006
101
Motie Van Velzen en Karimi tegen exportkredietfinanciering
12 april 2006
100
Motie Karimi en Van Velzen mogelijk maken vervolging brokering
12 april 2006
99
Motie Karimi en Van Velzen eindbestemming van bedrijf eisen.
12 april 2006
98
Overzicht van een schriftelijk overleg, veel onderwerpen onder andere catch all
15 maart 2006
2006
19: 6 moties, 7 brieven, 3 AO, 2 rapportages, 1 schriftelijk overleg
97
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e heflt 2005
16 december 2005
96
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2004
26 september 2005
95
«Zicht op de economische effecten van het Nederlandse exportcontrolebeleid»
13 juli 2005
11 juli 2005
94
Brief Van Gennip relatie tussen de exportkredietverzekering (EKV), sondages en wapenexportvergunningen
28 juni 2005
93
Brief Minister Bot m.b.t. Motie Blom, Karimi over ATT
2 mei 2005
92
Motie Blom en Karimi rond ATT
21 april 2005
91
Motie Van Velzen om af te zien van leveranties aan Indonesische luchtmacht
21 april 2005
90
Motie Van Velzen over intrekken exportkrediet fregat Hadjar Dewantara
21 april 2005
89
Motie Karimi naar export componenten door vijf grootste exporteurs
21 april 2005
88
Motie Karimi en Van Velzen over instellen vergunningstop India en Pakistan
21 april 2005
87
Verslag van een AO
7 april 2005
86
Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg
9 maart 2005
85
Brief Van Gennip over uitvoer India en Pakistan
5 januari 2005
84
Brief Minister Bot over uitvoer India en Pakistan
5 januari 2005
83
Brief Van Gennip n.a.v. 2Vandaag uitzending over WMD exporten
9 februari 2005
2005
12: 5 moties, 5 brieven, 1 AO, 3 rapportages, 1 schriftelijk overleg
82
Brief Minister Bot en stssec Van Gennip over wapenexport rapport 2003
25 oktober 2004
81
Notitie Bot en Van Gennip leverantie marineschip Indonesië
16 februari 2004
80
Brief Minister Bot uitvoer naar Indonesië
21 januari 2004
2004
3 brieven


79
Verslag van een AO
22 december 2003
78
Motie Van Velzen onderzoek inzet Indonesische marine
8 december 2003
77
Motie Karimi, Blom, Van Velzen uitbreiding vergunningsplicht doorvoer
8 december 2003
76
Motie Karimi, Van Velzen uitbreiding vergunningsplicht doorvoer
8 december 2003
75
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 2003
27 november 2003
74
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2002
24 september 2003
73
Brief Van Gennip rond wederuitvoer
24 juli 2003
72
Brief Minister De Hoop Scheffer met huidige stand van zaken exporten India en Pakistan
16 juli 2003
2003
8: 3 moties, 2 brieven, 1 AO, 2 rapportages,
71
Brief Wijn met antwoorden op vragen CtW
12 december 2002
70
Motie Karimi, Van Velzen, alleen afgeven importvergunning als eindbestemming bekend is
10 december 2002
69
Motie Karimi, instellen onderzoek doorvoer problematiek
10 december 2002
68
Motie Karimi, Van Velzen, Koenders, De Graaf vergunningsplicht doorvoer instabiele regio's
10 december 2002
67
Brief Wijn met antwoorden op vragen in AO
4 december 2002
66
Verslag van een AO
20 november 2002
65
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 2002
4 november 2002
64
Brief vertrouwelijk overzicht wapenexportvergunningen
4 november 2002
63
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2001
10 juli 2002
62
Brief Van Aartsen tegengaan verspreiding SAWL
18 juni 2002
61
Verslag van een AO
8 februari 2002
2002
11: 3 moties, 3 brieven, 2 AO, 2 rapportages, 1 overig
60
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 2001
12 december 2001
59
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 2000
26 juli 2001
58
Verslag van een AO
13 februari 2001
57
Motie Vos en Van Bommel handhaven embargo India en Pakistan
30 januari 2001
56
Motie handhaven embargo China
30 januari 2001
55
Motie Apostolou, De Haan en Hoekema om alleen te leveren voor reparatie en onderhoud aan India en Pakistan
30 januari 2001
54
Brief Ybema over schending NPV door Nederland
26 januari 2001
2001
7: 3 moties, 1 brief, 1 AO, 2 rapportages
53
Brief Ybema rond vergunningstop
19 december 2000
52
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 2000
20 november 2000
51
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden
11 juli 2000
50
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 1999
10 juli 2000
49
Brief Van Aartsen over spanningsgebiedencriterium
24 mei 2000
48
Brief Ybema over Wassnenaar Agreement
27 maart 2000
47
Brief Van Aartsen en Ybema nw criterium: deelname VN-register
24 februari 2000
2000
7: 4 brieven, 2 rapportages, 1 lijst van vragen en antwoorden
46
Verslag AO kleine wapens
6 december 1999
45
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 1999
5 november 1999
44
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 1998
6 september 1999
43
Verslag van een AO
1 februari 1999
1999
4: 2 AO, 2 rapportages


42
Motie Vos, Van Ardenne handhaven vergunningstop China
31 december 1998
41
Motie Apostolou, Van Ardenne, Hoekema en Vos handhaven vergunningstop India en Pakistan
31 december 1998
40
Brief Van Aartsen, Herfkens en Ybema nw. accenten wapenexportbeleid
10 december 1998
39
Aanbiedingsbrief wapenexport rapport 1997
7 oktober 1998
38
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 1998
6 oktober 1998
37
Verslag van een AO
19 juni 1998
36
Brief Van Mierlo uitstel geaggregeerde exportcijfers 1997
16 juni 1998
35
Lijst van vragen en antwoorden M483A1
24 april 1998
34
Motie Apostolou en Van den Doel export- en doorvoercontrole
23 april 1998
33
Motie Sipkes intrekken vergunning M483A1
23 april 1998
32
Aanbiedingsbrief 2e heflt 1997
23 april 1998
31
Brief Van Mierlo EU CoC
23 april 1998
30
Brief Minister Van Mierlo, stssecs Van Dok-van Weele en Gmelich Meijling rond openbaarheid
17 maart 1998
29
Brief Van Mierlo rond M483A1 Eurometaal Turkije
13 februari 1998
1998
4 moties, 5 brieven, 1 AO, 3 rapportages, 1 lijst van vragen en antwoorden
28
Aanbiedingsbrief 1e helft 1997
11 november 1997
27
Verslag van een AO over Nederlandse wapenexporten en opgave VN-register
3 november 1997
26
Brief Minister Van Mierlo met overzicht totaal waarde in 1996 verleende vergunningen
4 juni 1997
25
Verslag van een AO
13 maart 1997
2007
1 brief, 2 AO, 1 rapportage
24
Motie Van den Doel, Houda, Van den Bos informeren over alle toegestane leveranties
19 december 1996
23
Motie Van Ardenne informeren over alle toegestane leveranties
19 december 1996
22
Motie Sipkes over toetsingscriteria vergunningen
19 december 1996
1996
3 moties
21
Brief stssec Van Rooy immateriële dienstverlening
6 april 1994
1994
brief
20
Brief stssec Van Rooy COCOM
17-december 1993
1993
brief
19
Motie Weisglas strafbaarheid uitvoer goederen WMD
17 april 1992
18
Motie van Weezel en Van Gijzel verandering In- en Uitvoerwet
17 april 1992
17
Brief Van Rooy
7 april 1992
16
Motie Weisglas strafbaarheid uitvoer goederen WMD
2 april 1992
15
Motie van Weezel en Van Gijzel verandering In- en Uitvoerwet
2 april 1992
14
Motie van Gijzel over informatievoorziening
2 april 1992
13
Motie Rosenmöller over jaarlijks rapport wapenexporten
2 april 1992
12
Motie Rosenmöller over einbestemmingsverklaring
2 april 1992
11
Motie Rosenmöller aanleggen zwarte lijst
2 april 1992
10
Motie Rosenmöller mensenrechtencriterium zonder onderscheid inzet
2 april 1992
9
Brief Minister BuZa en stssec EZ Exportbeleid
27 februari 1992
8
Brief van den Broek, totaalcijfers NAVO, niet-NAVO
11 februari 1992
1992
9 moties, 2 brief, 1 rapportage
7
Brief Van den Broek antwoord op vraag Eurometaal
31 oktober 1991
6
Brief van den Broek over transparantie
4 november 1991
5
Brief van den Broek, totaalcijfers NAVO, niet-NAVO
10 oktober 1991
4
Lijst van antwoorden
14 juni 1991
3
Lijst van vragen
16 mei 1991
2
Nota Wapenexportbeleid
28 maart 1991
1
Aanbiedingsbrief nota
28 maart 1991
1991













Week 14 in #25tweets

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De verwikkelingen in Syrië hebben voor Europa in eerste instantie meer machtspolitieke dan wapenhandel gevolgen. De Britse pers dook in de geschiedenis van leveringen van grondstoffen voor chemische wapens. Als ik bekijk wat Nederland vanaf 1992 leverde, kom ik de 'glycol' zaak (1,2-ethaandiol) uit 2013/14 tegen, maar ook een oude levering van Methyldiethanolamine (MDEA) uit 2000. MDEA is een voorloper voor de productie van chemische wapens en wordt dan ook genoemd als categorie 3 stof in Verdrag chemische wapens, Methyldi-ethanolamine). De stof wordt ook civiel gebruikt in petrochemie en olierafinaderijen. De gifgaskwestie en volgende Tomahawk beschieingen duwden zelfs het in de Engelstalige pers dominante wapenhanel nieuws rond het beschoek van de Britse premier aan Saudi-Arabië weg.

Nederland(zie ook 19)
1 – 050417: Individual dual-use export licenses 2004-2016. (in Dutch) #rijksoverheidnl https://t.co/jPrnzu1TgO

2 – 060417: Retweet @HenkGeveke: Vanmiddag met @defensie op Ypenburg eerste paal geslagen van nieuwe faciliteiten van #TNO voor Ballistic Research en Directed Energy Weapons

EUROPA
3 – 030417: EU Foreign Ministers: Common Position on arms exports must be strictly applied regarding Yemen conflict http://bit.ly/2oV6iCU

4 – 050417: #EU on minimising the risk of diversion of #SALW to illicit markets, illegal armed groups, terrorists etc. http://bit.ly/2ntxHPa

Duitsland(zie )
5 – 040417: Germany’s Die Linke election program (Sept. 2017), replace NATO and stop arms trade. http://bit.ly/2nQkSd1

Frankrijk(zie 15)

Polen
6 – 090417: Report: EU member #Poland to accelerate its defence exports to Middle East #MENA and developing countries. http://bit.ly/2olVxeN

Tsjechië
7 – 060417: Almost unnoticed #Czech L-159 light-attack #aircraft to #Argentina and #Iraq. http://bit.ly/2pgycsa

VK(zie ook 18)
8 – 050417: Half of global arms trade [English language] news last 24 hrs on: Theresa May's dilemma on Brexit trade mission to Saudi Arabia. http://bit.ly/2ntu6Ay
#Brexit countdown leaves British defense industry uneasy. RUSI conference. http://bit.ly/2omrd3I

Zweden (zie ook 11, 23)
9 – 080417: How surprising: Swedish defense industry uneasy over proposed export controls. http://bit.ly/2olIY32

Midden-Oosten (zie ook 6)

REST VAN DE WERELD

Australië (zie ook 24)
Bangladesh (zie 14)

Brazilië
10 – 050417: Diplomats: What are they good 4? #Brazil asks its diplomats help increase weapons exports http://bit.ly/2oS0XyR

China (zie 20)

Eritrea
11 – 040417: US places #Eritrea under fresh sanctions for #military deal with North #Korea  … via @Africa-News http://bit.ly/2oUZ7KZ

India (zie ook )
12 – 050417: Indian start-up Tonbo beats companies from Europe & Israel in refugee control tech order 4 North Africa & Macdonia. http://bit.ly/2olKfXS

13 – 060417: Strong order inflow to bring earnings upgrades for #Thales partner the Indian #BEL. http://bit.ly/2oOJsjv

14 – 060417: Buy first pay later. India likely to offer USD 500 million Line of Credit to Bangladesh http://dnai.in/eeBy  via @dna http://bit.ly/2oerncX

Indonesië

15 – 030417: #Korrupsi proof? #Indonesia to barter #French #weapons with rubber http://bit.ly/2oSkzCW

Jemen (zie 3)

Marokko
16 – 050417: #Raytheon supplies #Morocco 317 AIM-9X Block II #Sidewinder missiles & 199 Block II captive air-training #missiles http://bit.ly/2oV9Mp0

Panama(zie 23)
Saoedi-Arabië(zie 3, 8)

Syrië
17 – 090417: War what is it good 4? US defence contractors shares rise after Syrian Tomahawk missile strikes. http://bit.ly/2olLPJA

18 – 090417: A story which unfolded in Netherlands a few years ago: Could Britain have sold #sarin chemicals to #Assad’s regime? http://bit.ly/2oesCZB

19 – 090417: Dutch 2014 debate on agents for chemical weapons was on Glycol. Government provided list with global exports of it. http://bit.ly/2nQtY9N

Thailand
20 – 050417: #Thailand: Cabinet approves army’s procurement of ten #Chinese #tanks to replace old US tanks http://bit.ly/2nXtoYq

Taiwan (zie ook 23)
21 – 050417: Who is selling the design? #Taiwan to build 8 #submarines under indigenous shipbuilding project via @ReutersIndia http://bit.ly/2ntC6ld

22 – 090417: Why the #F35 Lightning II isn't a wise choice (for #Tapei) EDITORIAL: Buying the right weapons http://bit.ly/2odqfEP

Zuid-Afrika (zie 25)

DEFENSIE-INDUSTRIE

Damen
23 – 040417: Panama naval air service buys Damen interceptor craft paid by Taiwan. http://bit.ly/2nXhLAH

24 – 060417: #Damen Shipyards Group submitted a tender to deliver twelve Offshore Patrol Vessels to the Royal #Australian Navy. http://bit.ly/2oRZvwh

Thales Nederland (zie 13)

WAPENS

F-35 (zie 22)
Onderzeeboten (zie 21)
Kleine wapens (zie 4)

Corruptie (zie ook 15)
25 – 050417: Kumi Naidoo calls on SA’s leaders to join fight to end corruption. Add: also those who pay the bribes. via @BDliveSA http://bit.ly/2oejvbv

Vluchtelingen (zie 12)

Controlling cyber technology by Catch-all

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During the North-African uprisings of 2011 it became clear cyber technologies were part of the tools for internal repression. Amnesty International summarised its concerns in 2014: “Surveillance technologies are not simply harmless tools. In the wrong hands they are often used as a tool of repression. Evidence is continuing to reveal the extent of this secretive trade that puts countless individuals at direct risk from human rights abusing governments. More and more stories emerge showing these damaging and often unlawful technologies affecting political activists, human rights defenders, refugees, dissidents and journalists, with some technologies placing entire populations under surveillance.” In 2014 Human Rights Watch released an article on the Ethiopian government spying on its citizens in Europe. The technology Ethiopia used was sold by European companies.


Companies do not care what happens with their exported surveillance technology, according to a leading Dutch daily. The paper referred to an investigation of Al Jazeera in the murky world of surveilance exports. Reporter Simon Boazman wondered if it“will it ever be possible for this booming industry to be properly regulated?” The European Commision is trying exactly that, and proposed an improved Regulation on Dual use control, which is under pressure from the industry lobby.

New Dual Use regulation

The misuse of surveillance tools and know-how is reasons for the EU to update and expand its Dual Use Regulation. A new Dual Use order is proposed by the Commission for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical assistance and transit of Dual Use items. The new ruling should have a number of objections:

* to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);

* to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to sensitive items and will thus contribute to the fight against terrorism; and


* in light of the increasing blurring between the civilian and defence sectors, to add to the EU's efforts to counter so-called hybrid threats*;

* for the provisions relating to the control of cyber-surveillance technologies, to contribute to the protection of human rights globally (and fill the juridical gap for control).

It is expected that adoption will not be earlier than by the end of 2017, with regulation entering at its quickest into force spring 2018. The proposal is wide ranging and has five different options: keeping present regulations; implementation and enforcement by soft law and guidance; system upgrade; modernisation; and complete overhaul implying full centralisation of controls at EU level. It must reduce administrative burden by making control simpler and less costly and improve security, human rights, and the fight against terrorism.

Dual use products are strategic goods which can be used both for militarily and civil applications. Many cyber technologies are already part of the Wassenaar Dual Use list. They are well-described on lists for strategic (military or dual use) goods. The European Commission wants to add a EU list for surveillance technologies. Besides military and dual use products, there are also products with an unforeseen military application. This category is controlled by a so-called Catch-all clause. This means that items not on the lists for strategic goods can still be controlled, also when it is newly developed technology not (yet) listed. The European Commission has proposed an expanded and uniform Catch-all policy for the whole EU to control cyber surveillance technologies (cost) effectively. The Catch-all clause targets technology considered a possible danger to security and human rights, without having all this technology obligatory to reporting. Compared to a leaked draft, several technologies are removed from the list, such as biometrics, location tracking devices, probes and deep package inspection systems. Industry influence seems to be strong.

Catch-all

The Catch-all is the least known part of the control on strategic products, but its importance can not be underestimated. One third of the EU Dual Use export denials were connected to Catch-alls, according to an 2009evaluation report of Dutch arms export policy (see for furtherDutch Catch-all info). A mandatory consultation procedure between competent authorities to ensure the EU-wide application and validity of Catch-all decisions is included in the proposal. As are regular exchanges of information between the Commission and Member States and a "Catch-all database" recording Catch-all licensing requirements, end-users and items of concern. Transparency to civil society will be a future issue here.

The current European Dual Use Catch-all (article 4) has – to summarize - a scope which includes items for: the development of weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering such weapons; military end-use in the country of destination subjected to an EU, UN or OSCE arms embargo; and for military use without the proper license required. The following Catch-all Provisions are still being edited and adjusted.

1.2.1. Ensuring legal certainty for the so-called ‘Catch-all’ clause

As a further way to increase controls on items that can be used for violations of human rights, the Commission is proposing to extend the ‘Catch-all’ clause initially introduced to protect national security:

Article 4(1): ‘An authorisation shall be required for the export of Dual Use items not listed in Annex I if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part:

(d) ‘for use by persons complicit in or responsible for directing or implementing grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict or internal repression in the country of final destination, as identified by relevant public international institutions, or European or national competent authorities, and where there is evidence of the use of this or similar technology or equipment for directing or implementing such grave violations by the proposed end-user.

(e) ’for use in connection with acts of terrorism’

Government position

The Dutch government has a number of reservations about the Dual Use proposal. First of all it doesn't agree with the Commission that it will make control cheaper. Human Rights and anti-terrorism are added as issues and for that reason implementation of control will cost extra personnel at the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Internal Affairs and Defence. Secondly the Dutch government is of the opinion that cyber technology should be controlled according to lists of the international Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and Dual Use goods and technologies and not by a list developed by the EU on its own (a viewpoint shared by the industry). “On a global level this [the EU developing its own list] creates disadvantages for European companies.” The Netherlands is also concerned the proposed implementation moment of the regulation (ninety days after publication) is too fast for medium and small enterprises to adapt. Exchange of Catch-all information among EU countries is also questioned, because catching is often based on the work of intelligence and security services and sharing this would collide with the confidentiality of the information. The sharing of intelligence is not compulsory in the EU (art 346 VWEU). The Netherlands also fears the Catch-all may be used for trade policies.

According to the Dutch government, adding human rights and anti-terror controls gives the EU a frontrunner position. But the government expects that opposition to the proposal will be strong, foremost against sharing of intelligence and broadening the Dual Use regulation to include human rights.

Industry opposition

Moreover, the industry is lobbying strongly against the proposal. Although politically correct underlining that human rights and security are very important, they have a range of arguments against the proposed policy, and the Catch-all is one of their major issues. Digital Europe– combining the lobby strength of big names in the IT industry, andmember of the Expert Group set up by the Commission - calls the proposal disproportionate: “it creates the wrong environment for the operation and growth of digital services.” The Federation of German Industries (BDI), operating under the slogan 'Voice of German Industry', wrote in a 2016 report: “Avoid Catch-all rules, give preference to product and country lists.” BusinessEurope wrote in itsMarch 2017 Newsletter: “Businesses need certainty and predictability. The development of guidelines will contribute to achieving this objective but it is important that businesses are involved in the process.”

The industry wants a clear definitions of products which should fall under the regulation; technology should“be controlled by technical characteristics and capabilities and not by their potential misuse,” Digital Europe states. But the proposal is not as vague as the industry portrays. Bert Gevers et al state: “The only items which are actually added to Annex 1 in the Proposal are inserted in the brand new Category 10 (“other items of cyber-surveillance technology”). (…) As such, the addition of these items to the list of controlled Dual Use items, will likely not result in serious competitive disadvantages for EU exporters.”

With the present proposal, industry gets the least demanding option. Because it is either a clear and sharp definition with a Catch-all in the background as safety net for what should be controlled, or a broad definition of Dual Use which is much more demanding for the industry because it brings much more products under obligatory reporting. Vanderkerckhoven en Kreijen wrote on the demand for technological specifics:“(..) it seemed contradictory that a ‘Catch-all’-provision would be updated with a list of very specific items and end-uses. At least from a legislative perspective it makes more sense to include specific items in the definition of ‘Dual Use’ items and its Annexes.”

Black list

Digital Europe proposes a Catch-all based on a published list of excluded entities or end-users. Digital Europe states the current application“is based on a minimum of legal certainty, e.g. if the country of destination is subject to an arms embargo,” and with the new proposal this certainty disappears. But already items can be stopped by using the Catch-all without an arms embargo and thus without a clear certainty for the exporter. That is the reason the Catch-all is used with prudence. In the Dutch export control user guide on strategic goods it is stated: “Since the imposition of a Catch-all provision may lead to diminished legal certainty, the government uses its power to impose a mandatory license requirement with great prudence and caution.” This seems also be the policy of EU countries in general, as Vankerckhoven en Kreijen state: “but it must be said that at least under the current Regulation the different national export control authorities have used their power to impose a license based on the Catch-all provision, with great prudence and caution.” The Catch-all offers flexibility to governments to control (new) technology. Black lists, technology lists and country lists run against this flexibility and can for example be diplomatically unwise. That it is based on 'awarness' in the industry to ask if an license is needed, means that governments have to provide information and education for industries. The Netherlands had a well-known case with applying a catch-all in theexports by Slebos Research to Pakistan in connection with the nuclear programs of Abdul Qadeer Khan (see for more Project Butter Factory). Slebosgot a suspended fine of € 85.000, with a probation of one day only, despite the seriousness of the case.

Economy versus human rights

During a Civil Society Dialogue meetingDenis Redonnet, director of EU Trade Strategy in the Directorate for Trade, stated that“(t)he right balance between security and economics” was leading. Official documents are however loaded with economic considerations. It is clear that sometimes security and human rights policy can come at the expense of economic interests. This can not be said enough to counter the IT-industry lobby.

Civil society stakeholders are less visible in the lobby. In 2015, the Steering Committee of the Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports (CAUSE), bringing together large human rights organisations, open society and technology organisations, published a report stating e.g. “The use of a dedicated catch-all mechanism, with stipulation on end-use and end-users, should be employed to future proof the Dual-Use Regulation in light of technological developments by allowing member state authorities to subject emerging technologies of concern to export authorisation.” CAUSE showed how Italy prevented in 2012 the sale of surveillance technology to Syria.

Some EU-countries are publishing their Dual Use exports. The Netherlands is one of those and accuracy is even growing. In 2017 the Netherlandsreported the export of crypto software to a number of countries: Afghanistan, Belarus, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Somalia, Turkey and Ukraine. According to CAUSE controls on those deliverances should be ended, because, “cryptography is a key security measure to protect the confidentiality of communications, and to also ensure trust and confidence in digital interactions.” The Netherlands stated on earlier deliverances that the end users were private companies, mostly in the telecom sector, and that the danger of technology being used for human rights violations is carefully considered by the Dutch government. Considering the countries of destination, those controls are not redundant.

* Hybrid threats
refers to mixture of activities often combining conventional and unconventional methods, that can be used in a coordinated manner by state and non-state actors while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. The objective is not only to cause direct damage and exploit vulnerabilities, but also to destabilise societies and create ambiguity to hinder decision-making. Geschreven voor Stop Wapenhandel.
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